











The application of relative truth to areas of natural language semantics is in vogue. For
example, philosophers such as John MacFarlane, Peter Lasersohn, Max Kölbel and Tam-
ina Stephenson have argued that relativism can do a better job at accommodating the
semantic data from discourse about matters of taste than competing semantic theories.1
In particular, relativists are quick to point out that unlike the rival contextualist seman-
tics, the relativist semantics can oer a satisfactory account of disagreement in discourse
about taste. In the present work I side with the relativists by drawing attention to dis-
agreement data which contextualists cannot accommodate. However, the disagreement
data does not unambiguously favor relativism. Nor does the assertion and retraction data
which is often taken to motivate relativism. Rather, I contend that the best explanation
of the disagreement, assertion and retraction data is provided by the more parsimonious
semantics oered by nonindexical contextualism.
1See, MacFarlane 2014, Stephenson 2007, Lasersohn 2005, and Kölbel 2002.
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Abstrakt
Det er på moten å anvende sannhetsrelativisme for å angi en tilfredstillende semantikk
for naturlig språk. For eksempel har losofer som John MacFarlane, Peter Lasersohn,
Max Kölbel, og Tamina Stephenson argumentert for at en relativistisk semantikk er bedre
egnet enn konkurrerende semantiske teorier til å forklare de semantiske data i diskurs
om smakssaker. Særlig er relativister raske til å påpeke at i motsetning til den rivalis-
erende kontekstuelle semantikken kan en relativistisk semantikk redegjøre for uenighet
i diskurs om smak. I arbeidet som foreligger tar jeg relativistenes side ved å trekke fram
uenighetsdata som kontektualistene ikke kan redegjøre for. Uenighetstilfellene faller imi-
dlertid ikke utvetydig relativistene til gode. Det samme gjelder tilfellene av hevdelse og
tilbakekalling som ofte blir fremlagt som evidens for en relativistisk semantikk. I stedet
argumenterer jeg for at den beste forklaringen på uenighet, hevdelse og tilbakekallings-
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Taken at face value, the predicates of taste, e.g., ‘tasty’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘fun’, exhibit an
idiosyncratic avor unique to discourse about matters of taste. Consider the following
sentences:
(1) Seaweed is tasty.
(2) Chopin is playing the piano.
The truth of (2) does not seem to depend on the idiosyncratic taste of some agent. On
the other hand, the truth of (1) does seem to depend on the idiosyncratic taste of some
relevant agent. If this assumption about the truth of (1) is correct, how can we enrich,
say, a Kaplan-style semantic system to tackle discourse about matters of taste?
According to standard contextualism a sentence like (1) possess a form of indexicality,
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i.e., (1) might express dierent propositions at dierent contexts of use. On this view
the propositional content of (1), used at a context C by a speaker S would be seaweed is
tasty to S. If the contention that (1) possess a form indexicality is true, we could provide
correct semantics for (1) by minor tinkering on the much used semantic framework of
David Kaplan. But modeling the semantics of the predicates of taste on the semantics
of indexicals is not problem free. For example, if contextualism is true, it becomes hard
to make sense of disagreement in discourse about matters of taste. The problem is that
someone who uses (1) and someone who uses (3) seem to disagree.
(3) Seaweed is not tasty.
But on the contextualist view it is not clear what the object of disagreement would be. A
use of (1) by Plato would express the proposition that seaweed is tasty to Plato, whilst a
use of (3) by Aristotle would express the proposition that seaweed is not tasty to Aristotle.
Since Plato and Aristotle are expressing dierent and compatible propositions they can
hardly be said to disagree on the contextualist picture.
The problem of lost disagreement will also emerge if we try out an expressivist account
of (1). According to expressivism our initial assumption that (1) expresses a truth apt
proposition is false. Instead of taking a use of (1) to express a proposition that somehow
concerns the taste of the speaker, expressivists suggest that we take a use of (1) to express
an attitude of appreciation for the taste of seaweed. But if that is the case, we once again
face a case of lost disagreement because there is no proposition at all that can serve as
the object of disagreement.
Proponents of nonindexical contextualism (henceforth NIC) propose to accommodate
disagreement by expanding on the semantics Kaplan suggested for (2). According to
Kaplan the propositional content of (2) is modally and temporally neutral; yet the truth
2
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of (2) used at a context C depends on whether or not Chopin is playing the piano at
the world and time of C.1 Transferring this line of thought to (1), we can stipulate that
the propositional content of (1) is not only modally and temporally neutral, but also,
perspective-neutral. We could then explain the idiosyncrasy of (1) by evaluating the
truth of (1) with respect to a world, time and perspective supplied by the context of use.
This move does not only let us capture the idiosyncratic aspect of (1), but it also lets us
explain why an utterance of (1) and an utterance of (3) seem to express a disagreement.
If Plato were to use (1) he would express the proposition that seaweed is tasty, and if
Aristotle were to use (3) he would express the proposition that seaweed is not tasty. Now,
there is a proposition that Plato believes whilst Aristotle believes the negation of that
proposition.
However, NIC is not a dominating position in contemporary semantics. Instead it is
common to prefer the relativistic systems of semanticists like John MacFarlane, Peter
Lasersohn, Max Kölbel and Tamina Stephenson.2 These relativist systems all follow the
strategy outlined above by employing an additional parameter to capture the idiosyn-
crasy of (1). Indeed, relativists too are quick to point out how the additional parameter
makes it possible to deal with phenomena such as disagreement. But if both the semantics
oered by NIC and the semantics oered by the relativists can accommodate disagree-
ment, how then, can we adjudicate between relativism and NIC? This question serves as
the starting point for our succeeding discussion of NIC.
1Kaplan 1977: 522.
2See, MacFarlane 2014, Lasersohn 2005, Kölbel 2002 and Stephenson 2007.
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1.1.1 Our Plan
Throughout this M.A. thesis my goal is to argue that NIC can better accommodate the
semantic data from discourse about taste than the more prominent contextualist and
relativist semantics. Hence, one the one hand, I aim to demonstrate that highly parsimo-
nious semantics of contextualism cannot oer a satisfactory explanation of the relevant
semantic data. On the other hand, I aim to demonstrate that the less parsimonious rel-
ativist semantics of Peter Lasersohn and John MacFarlane does not oer any clear-cut
explanatory benets when compared with NIC.
For the remainder of chapter 1, I outline and develop NIC. I start by showing how NIC
deals with some simple sentences whilst highlighting important similarities between Ka-
plan’s system in "Demonstratives" and NIC. Then I go on to give an account of how NIC
deals with assertion and retraction.
In chapter 2, I focus on NIC versus contextualism. First, I briey illustrate some of the
familiar issues that standard contextualism face with respect to indirect speech reports.
Subsequently, I turn to exible contextualism and argue that exible contextualists face
issues with sentences containing multiple predicates of taste. Whilst the previous issues
are signicant in their own right, it is the phenomenon of disagreement that stands at the
core of the debate about contextualism. Both standard and exible contextualists struggle
to provide an account of how it is possible for speakers to disagree about matters of taste.
I explore two possible responses to the problem of disagreement on behalf of contextual-
ism. The rst and arguably most promising response on behalf of contextualism is pro-
vided by Tornn Huvenes. Huvenes oers a view of disagreement where two parties can
disagree not only by having conicting doxastic attitudes, but also by having conicting
non-doxastic attitudes. I concede that Huvenes’ reconception of disagreement grants the
4
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contextualist an explanation of how there can be non-doxastic disagreement in discourse
about taste. However, I argue that once we take into consideration a suciently broad
range of data there are cases of disagreement which suggest that the disputing parties
are disagreeing by virtue of having conicting beliefs. If the data I draw attention to is
legitimate, contextualists still lack the means to explain the doxastic variety of disagree-
ment present in discourse about taste. The second contextualist response to the problem
of disagreement is to reject the contention that speakers disagree about matters of taste.
I show that this view does not sit well with the persistence of the disputes illustrated by
the semantic data. Finally, I present an account of disagreement for NIC that can explain
how two parties can disagree by having conicting beliefs about some matter of taste.
In conclusion, contextualists have posited some promising accounts of disagreement in
discourse about matters of taste; nevertheless, these accounts are still facing a burden of
recalcitrant data.
In chapter 3, I explore whether the semantic data suggest that relativism oers clear-cut
explanatory benets when compared to NIC. I start out by considering Peter Lasersohn’s
relativist system. Lasersohn motivates his brand of relativism by arguing that it can pro-
vide an account of disagreement in discourse about taste. However, I argue that NIC
can provide a similar account of disagreement whilst positing less unorthodox semantic
mechanisms. Subsequently, I turn to Tamina Stephenson’s relativist semantics. Stephen-
son has drawn attention to disagreement data which she argues that neither the relativist
semantics of Lasersohn nor the semantics oered by NIC suce to accommodate. I ob-
ject, that Stephenson’s interpretation of the disagreement data is awed. Furthermore, I
argue that Stephenson’s relativist semantics makes wrong predictions about the potential
resolvability of disagreements in discourse about taste. Finally, I turn to MacFarlane’s as-
sessment sensitive relativism. MacFarlane motivates assessment sensitive relativism via
5
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his account of disagreement and retraction. First, I object that MacFarlane’s assessment
sensitive account of disagreement does not oer any clear explanatory benets when
compared to the account of disagreement oered by NIC. Second, I turn my attention
towards MacFarlane’s account of retraction. MacFarlane has suggested that we need
assessment sensitive relativism in order to provide a satisfactory constitutive norm for
retraction. I argue that the relativist account of retraction does not sit well with the obser-
vation that there are competent speakers who do not intuit that they have an obligation
to retract in the cases where the relativists retraction norm tells us that a retraction is
mandatory. Finally, I propose an alternative account of retraction that better accommo-
dates our intuitions about retraction. Thus, I contend that the semantic data does not
suggest that the most prevalent relativist semantics oer any clear explanatory benets
when compared to NIC.
Of course, my defense of NIC is by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, at the end of the
MA-thesis I hope to have defended the view that NIC do have some potential advantages
when compared to the prominent contextualist and relativist semantics.
1.2 NIC
Currently, the best developed versions of nonindexical contextualism are the versions of
Nikola Kompa and John MacFarlane. Due to the prominence of MacFarlane’s views in the
debate about the predicates of taste my setup of NIC will draw mostly on MacFarlane’s
work. I do however deviate from both MacFarlane and Kompa where I nd it fruitful to
do so. For the remainder of chapter 1, I present the semantics of NIC and clarify what I
commit myself to defend.
6
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1.2.1 Contents and Circumstances of Evaluation
It is useful to think of NIC as an expansion of the semantics that Kaplan developed in the
paper "Demonstratives".3 Because of this, I start this section by outlining a Kaplan-style
semantic framework. Then, I show how to expand Kaplan’s framework in order to obtain
NIC.
In Kaplan’s framework expressions are associated with two sorts of meaning. The rst
sort of meaning is called content. In general the content of an expression can be rep-
resented as a function from circumstances of evaluation (world-time pairs in Kaplan’s
system) to appropriate extensions.4 In the case of a sentence the content is a proposition
and its extension at a circumstance of evaluation is a truth value. The second sort of
meaning is called character. The character of an expression determines its content rela-
tive to a context and it can be represented as a function from contexts to contents. The
view above can be illustrated by considering the following sentences:
(4) I am a novelist.
(5) Vincent van Gogh is painting.
The character of an indexical like the rst person pronoun ‘I’ can be represented as a
non-constant function from contexts to contents. This means that the content of ‘I’ might
change from one context to another. By extension, the proposition expressed by (4) might
change from one context to another. If Tolstoy utters (4) at a context C it will express
the proposition that Tolstoy is a novelist. If Dostoyevsky utters (4) at C’ it will express
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Because of this all uses of (5) will invariantly express the proposition that Vincent van
Gogh is painting.
On Kaplan’s theory, the propositions expressed by (4) and (5) only have truth values with
respect to circumstances consisting of 〈w, t〉 pairs where w is a world and t is a time. 5
Why settle on circumstances consisting of 〈w, t〉 pairs? Kaplan takes the propositions
expressed by (4) and (5) to be modally and temporally neutral. In other words, the propo-
sitions expressed by (4) and (5) are not about any particular world or time. Yet, they only
have truth values with respect to world-time pairs. Thus, Kaplan settles on 〈w, t〉 pairs in
order to accommodate the modal and temporal neutrality of the propositions expressed
by sentences like (4) and (5). In general then, the parameters needed to do semantics for a
language L will depend at least in part on the level of propositional neutrality expressed
by the sentences of L.
We have seen that Kaplan takes propositions to have truth values with respect to cir-
cumstances of evaluation consisting of 〈w, t〉 pairs. But what circumstance of evaluation
is relevant when evaluating the truth of (5) as used at C? According to Kaplan it is the
circumstance of the context of use that is the relevant circumstance to consider when
evaluating a use of (5) for truth:
If C is a context, then an occurrence of φ in C is true i the content expressed
by φ in this context is true when evaluated with respect to the circumstance
of the context.6
Notice the twofold role played by the context C in Kaplan’s system. First the context
and character determines the propositional content expressed by the use of a sentence.
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them to be the circumstance of the context.
Now that I have outlined Kaplan’s framework I can expand it in order to obtain NIC. Let’s
start by considering the following sentences:
(6) Rhubarb is tasty.
(7) Beatrice is beautiful.
Syntactically NIC treats ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ as one-place predicates. In (6) the one-place
predicate ‘tasty’ and the common noun ‘Rhubarb’ forms an atomic sentence. Similarly
the one-place predicate ‘beautiful’ and the proper noun ‘Beatrice’ form the atomic sen-
tence in (7). Under NIC the proposition expressed by a use of (6) at any context will be
the proposition that rhubarb is tasty. That is, just plain tasty, not tasty to any particular
individual or group of individuals. Similarly the proposition expressed by a use of (7) at
any context will be the proposition that Beatrice is beautiful. That is, just plain beauti-
ful, not beautiful to any particular individual or group of individuals. Hence, NIC takes
the propositional content expressed by (6)-(7) to be taste-neutral in addition to modally
and temporally neutral. How then, can we accommodate the widespread propositional
neutrality posited by the semantics of NIC?
We saw above that Kaplan used circumstances of evaluation consisting of 〈w, t〉 pairs in
order to accommodate the modal and temporal neutrality of the propositions expressed
by sentences like (5). Moreover, it is worth noticing that Kaplan is open to the idea that
the circumstances might include additional features if needed:
By [‘circumstances’] I mean both actual and counterfactual situations with
respect to which it is appropriate to ask for the extensions of a given well-
formed expression. A circumstance will usually include a possible state or
9
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history of the world, a time, and perhaps other features as well.7
Proponents of NIC embrace Kaplan’s idea that we can add parameters to the circum-
stances if needed. Thus, in order to accommodate the taste, modal and temporal neutral-
ity of (6)-(7) we expand Kaplan’s 〈w, t〉 pairs into 〈w, t, g〉 triples where w is a world, t is
a time and g is a taste.8 The propositions expressed by (6)-(7) are now taken to have truth
values with respect to these expanded circumstances of evaluation. At this point we need
to address the following question: what circumstance of evaluation is relevant to deter-
mine whether a use of (6) at a context C is true or not? We saw that Kaplan privileged the
circumstance of the context of use and I contend that there is no need to stop privileging
the circumstance of the context of use when dealing with the predicates of taste. Thus,
proponents of NIC can dene truth at a context in the following manner:
An occurrence of φ at C is true i the proposition expressed by φ at C is true
at C, 〈wc, tc, gc〉, where wc is the world of C, tc is the time of C and gc is the
taste of C.
On this view (6) would be true at C just in case rhubarb is tasty to the taste of the agent
of C at the world and time of C. Similarly (7) would be true at C just in case Beatrice is
beautiful according to the taste of the agent of C at the world and time of C. Notice the
twofold role played by the context C in the system of NIC. First the context determines
the propositional content expressed by a sentence at a context. Subsequently the context
initializes the parameters of the circumstance, setting them to be the circumstance of the
context.9 Thus, NIC preserves the circumstance determining role of the context of use
that is prominent in Kaplan’s original framework.
7Kaplan 1977: 502.
8MacFarlane 2014: 88.
9See, MacFarlane 2009: 4-7. MacFarlane 2014: 88.
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Indeed, the taste parameter allows the proposition expressed by (6) to be true with re-
spect to some taste g and false with respect to another taste g’. By doing so the taste
parameter makes it possible to capture the apparent idiosyncratic aspect of the proposi-
tion expressed by (6), but does the evaluation of truth with respect to a taste parameter
also wed NIC to truth relativism? This question is tricky to answer mainly because there
is no consensus on what it takes for a semantic system to be genuinely relativistic about
truth. It is however entirely clear that NIC takes propositions to have truth values with
respect to circumstances of evaluation. If relativizing propositional truth to some n-tuple
of individually shiftable parameters is sucient to count as a truth relativist, then NIC
is wedded to truth relativism. But the upshot of this view is not only that NIC is wedded
to truth relativism, but that the majority of currently existing semantic frameworks are
wedded to truth relativism.10 Presumably then, taking propositions to have truth values
with respect to an n-tuple of parameters is a quite sober idea. However, even if this much
is conceded, one might still enquire if the taste parameter employed by NIC aects truth
in a dierent way than the world and time parameters employed by Kaplan. I am in-
clined to answer no; the taste parameter does not aect truth in a dierent manner than
the world and time parameters. The reason for this is, as I emphasized above, that NIC
uses the taste parameter in much the same manner as Kaplan used the world and time
parameters. That is, the taste parameter is set to be the taste of the context of use just
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1.2.2 Assertion
In the previous subsection we saw how NIC tells us to evaluate the truth of the propo-
sitions expressed by the sentences in (6)-(7). In this subsection I present an account of
assertion for NIC.
Consider that Annette condently utters the following sentence:
(8) Sisyphus is pushing a boulder.
What does it mean to say that by uttering (8), Annette also performed the speech act of
assertion? In the literature there is a large plurality of potential answers to our ques-
tion. Nonetheless, the account of assertion favored by MacFarlane is already playing a
prominent role in the debate about the predicates of taste. Because of this it is useful
to couch NIC with a pragmatic setup that draws heavily on MacFarlane’s views about
assertion.
Let’s start out by embracing the traditional assumption that there is a distinction between
the force and content of a speech acts. If Annette asserts (8), the content of her assertion
is the proposition that Sisyphus is pushing a boulder and its force is assertive.11 These
traditional notions are useful in their own right, but they do not tell us whether a par-
ticular assertion of (8) is in tune with the norms that govern the use of language. Nor do
they tell us what commitments speakers undertake by making assertions. We are going
to explore each of these aspects of assertion in turn.
Presumably, there is a variety of norms that govern the manner in which speakers per-
form assertions. For example, norms of politeness, evidence and relevance seem to im-
pact the way speakers assert. However, I am going to follow MacFarlane by assuming
11MacFarlane 2014: 17.
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that amongst the variety of norms that govern assertion there is a rule or potentially a
set of rules that are constitutive of assertion. What does is mean to say that a rule is
constitutive of assertion? Here it is useful to consider an analogy with board games. For
example, in chess there is a rule which says that a player cannot castle if that players king
is in check. This rule is constitutive of castling because nothing that is not subject to that
rule can count as castling. Similarly, to say that a rule is constitutive of assertion is to
say that anything that is not subject to the rule does not count as an assertion.12
In order to posit a plausible rule for assertion we need to get a grasp on when it would be
permissible for an agent to assert (8). In Kaplan’s framework the proposition expressed
by (8) is time-neutral, despite having a truth value only with respect to a certain time.
On this view (8) is correctly evaluated for truth with respect to a circumstance 〈w, t〉,
the world and time of the context of use. Furthermore, it seems natural to assume that
speakers are only permitted to assert (8) at C if the proposition expressed by (8) is true
at the world and time of C. This line of thought can be generalized into he following
constitutive assertion rule:
(A). At a context C, assert that p only if p is true at C.13
I have emphasized the similarities between the semantic system developed by David Ka-
plan in "Demonstratives" and the semantics oered by NIC. Most importantly I have
highlighted that NIC uses the taste parameter much like Kaplan uses the world and time
parameters. Because of the similarities it should be easy to transfer an account of as-
sertion built to handle sentences like (8) in a Kaplan-style framework to cover sentences
containing predicates of taste. With the previous remarks in mind, consider the following
pair of sentences:
12MacFarlane 2014: 101. See also, Williamson 2000: 239.
13MacFarlane 2014: 101.
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(6) Rhubarb is tasty.
(7) Beatrice is beautiful.
NIC tells us that (6)-(7) are correctly evaluated for truth with respect to a circumstance
〈w, t, g〉, the world and time and taste of the context of use. If we superimpose (A) onto
the semantics oered by NIC we get the result that a speaker will be permitted to assert
(6)-(7) at C i the propositions expressed by (6)-(7) are true at the world, time and taste
of C. As far as I can tell this seems to capture the way that we generally assert sentences
like (6)-(7).
We have seen that (A) tells us when speakers are permitted to make assertions. We
can now turn our attention to the commitments that speakers undertake by performing
assertions. The traditional view is that a speaker who makes an assertion undertakes a
commitment to the truth of the asserted proposition. But it is somewhat unclear what it
means to be committed to the truth of a proposition. MacFarlane has suggested that we
can make the idea more precise by saying that a commitment to the truth of a proposition
is comprised by the following set of commitments:14
(C1) Commitment to retract the assertion if and when it is shown to have
been untrue.
(C2) Commitment to justify the assertion (provide grounds for its truth) if
and when it is appropriately challenged.
(C3) Commitment to be held responsible if someone else acts on or reasons
from what is asserted, and it proves to have been untrue.15
Out of the three commitments above, the commitment to retract is the most hotly de-
bated one. What then, is a retraction? A retraction is a speech act that targets another
14MacFarlane 2005: 318.
15MacFarlane 2005: 318. See also, MacFarlane 2014: 108.
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speech act and the eect of a retraction is to disavow the commitments that ow from
the original speech act. By retracting a question, one releases the audience from the com-
mitment to answer the question, by retracting an assertion the retractor is released from
the obligation to honor (C1)-(C3).16
We shall explore the issue of providing a constitutive rule for retraction later on when
dealing with assessment sensitive relativism. For now, we are going to be satised by
considering an example that concern retraction in discourse about matters of taste. First,
suppose that John has asserted (6) in a conversation with Mary. Second, suppose that
Mary and John meet again some years after their rst conversation, but at this point,
John no longer likes the taste of rhubarb:
(9) a. Mary: Years ago you said that rhubarb was tasty, right?
b. John reply 1: Yes, but I take that back now.
c. John reply 2: Yes, I used to love rhubarb, but now I don’t.
In (9b) John is retracting by using the retraction marker ‘I take that back’. In (9c) John
does not retract. Instead he merely informs Mary that he does not like rhubarb anymore.
As far as I can tell, both (9b) and (9c) are natural responses to Mary’s question in (9a). At
the very least I do not intuit that John is violating (C1) by choosing not to retract in (9c).
Nonetheless, far from everyone in the debate about the predicates of taste share these
intuitions about the dialogue in (9). According to proponents of assessment sensitive
relativism we should intuit that John has an obligation to retract in (9).17 Allegedly, this
is a problem for NIC because the semantics of NIC cannot easily explain this purported








Contextualists of all stripes model the semantics of ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ on the seman-
tics of indexicals. For example, standard contextualists model the semantics of ‘tasty’ on
the rst-person pronoun ‘I’. In order to appreciate the manner in which standard con-
textualists model the semantics of ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ on ‘I’ it is useful to recall that
the semantic content expressed by a use of ‘I’ at a context C is the agent of C. Hence,
if Aristotle were to use (10) at C he would express the proposition that Aristotle misses
summer:
(10) I miss summer.
Similarly, if Plato were to use (10) at C’ he would express the proposition that Plato
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misses summer. With the examples featuring ‘I’ in mind, consider the following sentence
featuring ‘tasty’:
(11) Licorice is tasty.
According to standard contextualists, a use of (11) by Aristotle atC1 would have expressed
the proposition that:
Licorice is tasty [to Aristotle].
Where the content within the brackets is supplied by the context of use.1 On the other
hand if Plato where to use (11) at C2 he would have expressed the proposition that:
Licorice is tasty [to Plato].
The examples above outline the result obtained by modeling the semantics of ‘tasty’ on
the rst-person pronoun ‘I’. However, not all contextualists agree that the predicates of
taste ought to be modeled on ‘I’. Flexible contextualists contend that a use of (11) does not
necessarily build the taste of the speaker into the proposition expressed by (11). Instead
it might be the taste of any contextually relevant agent. Suppose that Aristotle and Plato
are eating licorice together at C. Furthermore suppose that Plato utters (11) at C. In such a
case, exible contextualists can contend that Plato’s utterance of (11) at C might express
one of the following propositions:
(12) a. Licorice is tasty [to Aristotle].
b. Licorice is tasty [to Plato].
c. Licorice is tasty [to Aristotle and Plato].
1Schaer 2009: 179.
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Whether Plato’s utterance at C expresses the proposition in (12a), (12b) or (12c) is deter-
mined by contextual features. This way of thinking about the predicates of taste is much
more akin to indexicals like ‘nearby’ and ‘local’ than ‘I’.
The structural virtue of contextualism lies in its parsimony. Since the propositional con-
tent of (11) is perspective-specic neither standard contextualists nor exible contextu-
alists need to posit any taste parameter in order to evaluate the truth of (11). Hence,
contextualists of most stripes can get by with a quite parsimonious n-tuple of parame-
ters. A contextualist who is also a temporalist can employ a Kaplan-style 〈w, t〉 pair and
dene truth at a context in the following manner:
An occurrence of φ at C is true i the proposition expressed by φ at C is true
at C, 〈wc, tc〉, where wc is the world of C, tc is the time of C.
Contextualists who endorse eternalism can make appropriate adjustments and replace
the 〈w, t〉 pair with 〈w〉 in the denition above. Because contextualism is a highly par-
simonious semantic theory there is a methodological incentive to favor contextualism
over NIC and other more complex semantic theories. Why then, should we not embrace
contextualism? It turns out that the dierent types of contextualism all face some prob-
lematic semantic data. In §2.2 I briey explore how standard contextualists have a hard
time with indirect speech reports. Then I show that even though exible contextualists
can handle the indirect speech reports, they have a hard time with sentences containing
multiple predicates of taste. In §2.3 I show that both standard and exible contextualism
struggle to provide a satisfactory account of disagreement in discourse about matters of
taste. In §2.4 I consider a promising response to the problem of disagreement championed
by Tornn Huvenes. Huvenes oers a view of disagreement where two parties can dis-
agree about various non-doxastic attitudes in addition to their doxastic attitudes. I admit
that Huvenes’ account of disagreement oers the contextualist an explanation of how
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there can be non-doxastic disagreements in discourse about matters of taste. However, I
present some disagreement data which suggests that the disputing parties are disagree-
ing by virtue of having conicting beliefs. If the data I draw attention to is legitimate
contextualists are still lacking the means to explain how there can be disagreement in
belief in discourse about taste. In §2.5 I show that expressivists face similar problems
concerning disagreement as contextualists. In §2.6 I consider the view that there are no
disagreements about matters of taste. I argue that this view is unsatisfactory insofar as
the disputes in discourse about about matters of taste cannot be resolved by linguistic
clarication. That is, the disputes are not easily explained as verbal disputes. In §2.6 I
present an account of disagreement for NIC.
2.2 Speech Reports
Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore has designed a test for indexicality which is based
on producing what they call an ‘Inter-Contextual Disquotational Indirect Report’ (hence-
forth indirect speech report). An indirect speech report can be dened in the following
manner:
Take an utterance u of a sentence S by speaker A in context C. An Inter-
Contextual Disquotational Indirect Report of u is an utterance u’ in a context
C’ (where C’ 6= C) of ‘A said that S’.2
Now consider the following case:
(13) a. Mary at C: I wrote a poem on the train.
b. John at C’: Mary said that I wrote a poem on the train.
2Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 88.
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If Mary utters (13a) atC then Mary expresses the proposition that she wrote a poem on the
train. Clearly John’s use of (13b) at C’ does not correctly report what Mary said by using
(13a) at C. What John reports is that Mary said that John wrote a poem on the train, not
that Mary wrote a poem on the train. Hence John’s indirect speech report is false. If this
is the result obtained by producing an indirect speech report of a sentence containing a
standard indexical like the rst-person pronoun ‘I’, then we should expect indirect speech
reports of sentences containing similar indexicals to come out false. Consider a report of
a sentence containing ‘tomorrow’:
(14) a. Mary on Monday: Tomorrow Bobby Fischer will play Garry Kasparov.
b. John on Tuesday: Mary said that tomorrow Bobby Fischer will play Garry
Kasparov.
Clearly, John’s report in (14b) is false. By using (14a) on Monday Mary asserted that Fisher
would play Kasparov on Tuesday. On the other hand, John’s use of (14b) on Tuesday
reports that Mary said that the match would be on Wednesday. Finally, consider the
following sentence:
(6) Rhubarb is tasty.
If ‘tasty’ is an indexical modeled on the semantics of ‘I’, an indirect speech report of (6)
should come out false just like the reports of (13a) and (14a) came out false. With this
in mind we can make the following contextualist conjecture: an utterance of ‘rhubarb is
tasty’ by speaker A at C cannot be reported by speaker B at C’ as ‘A said that rhubarb is
tasty’. NIC predicts the opposite outcome. According to NIC, any use of ‘rhubarb is tasty’
will express the same proposition. Hence, NIC predicts that an utterance of ‘rhubarb is
tasty’ by speaker A at C can be reported by speaker B at C’ as ‘A said that rhubarb is
tasty’.
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Here is the speech report:
(15) a. Mary at C: Rhubarb is tasty.
b. John at C’: Mary said that rhubarb is tasty.
John’s use of (15b) at C’ reports exactly what Mary said by using (15a) at C. In other
words, ‘tasty’ does not seem to behave like the rst person pronoun ‘I’. Similarly, standard
contextualism predicts that an utterance of ‘mountains are beautiful’ by speaker A at C
cannot be reported by speaker B at C’ as ‘A said that mountains are beautiful’ whilst NIC
predicts that the speech report should come out true. Here is the speech report:
(16) a. Mary at C: Mountains are beautiful.
b. John at C’: Mary said that mountains are beautiful.
Again, John’s indirect speech report is true. The data procured by using indirect speech
reports pose a considerable problem for standard contextualism. But not all contextual-
ists model the semantics of ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ on the semantics of ‘I’. Flexible contex-
tualists can model the semantics of ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ on the semantics of ‘local’ or
‘nearby’. If Mary uttered ‘Beatrice went to a nearby restaurant’ at C1 she would, roughly,
express the proposition that Beatrice went to a restaurant nearby L1, where L1 is a location.3
If John uttered ‘Beatrice went to a nearby restaurant’ at C2 he would , roughly, express
the proposition that Beatrice went to a restaurant nearby L2. Modeling the semantics of
‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ on the semantics of ‘nearby’ helps the contextualist because it is
possible to create true indirect speech reports of sentences containing ‘nearby’.4 Consider
the following case:
3Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 41-43.
4Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 39.
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(17) a. Mary at C: Beatrice went to a nearby restaurant.
b. John at C’: Mary said that Beatrice went to a nearby restaurant.
Here John’s use of (17b) at C’ seem to correctly report what Mary said by (17a) at C. How
can that be? Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne have argued that indirect speech
reports of sentences containing ‘nearby’ are parasitic, in the sense that John’s use of
‘nearby’ in (17b) takes on the semantic content of Mary’s use of ‘nearby’ in (17a). Because
John’s use of ‘nearby’ is parasitic on Mary’s use, it is possible for John to correctly report
what Mary said even though ‘nearby’ is an indexical. If it is possible for John’s use of
‘nearby’ to be parasitic on Mary’s use of ‘nearby’, then it should be possible for John’s use
of ‘tasty’ to be parasitic on Mary’s use of ‘tasty’. Hence, exible contextualism can handle
indirect speech reports by virtue of parasitism. But abandoning standard contextualism
in favor of exible contextualism is not problem free. Jason Stanley has showed that
exible contextualists about the epistemic ‘know’ cannot handle multiple occurrences
of ‘know’ within one sentence.5 For the rest of this section I outline Stanley’s original
argument and expand it to cover ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’.
Suppose that John is in Oslo, Norway. Furthermore suppose that John utters the following
sentence:
(18) If you have a car, Sweden is nearby, but if you are on foot, Sweden isn’t nearby.
Clearly, the two occurrences of ‘nearby’ are completed dierently in (18). If other expres-
sions like ‘know’, ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ are modeled on the case of ‘nearby’ we would
expect that dierent occurrences of ‘know’, ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ can be completed dier-
ently in the same sentence. However, Jason Stanley has argued that treating the semantic
5Stanley 2004: 138.
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mechanism of ‘know’ much like the semantic mechanism of ‘nearby’ leads to problems
when there are multiple occurrences of ‘know’ in one sentence.6 Consider these exam-
ples:
(19) a. Beatrice knows she has hands, but she does not know that she is not a bodiless
brain in a vat.
b. Beatrice knows she is a bodiless brain in a vat, but she does not know that she
does not have hands.7
If exible contextualism about ‘know’ is true, then we should be able to assert the sen-
tences in (19) without any problems because the occurrences of ‘know’ can be completed
dierently. But as Keith DeRose has pointed out we would not assert such "abominable
conjunctions".8
Similar issues arise with sentences containing multiple occurrences of ‘tasty’ and ‘beauti-
ful’. Suppose that John, Mary and Beatrice are eating licorice. Now consider the following
sentence:
(20) Licorice is tasty, but it is not tasty to me.
If exible contextualism is true, John should be able to assert (20) with the rst occur-
rence of ‘tasty’ meaning tasty to Mary and Beatrice and the latter occurrence of ‘tasty’
meaning tasty to John. But it is dicult to hear such a reading of (20). Similarly suppose
that John, Mary and Beatrice are looking at the Mona Lisa. Now, consider the following
sentence:
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(21) The Mona Lisa is beautiful, but she is not beautiful to me.
Again John should be able to assert (21) with the rst occurrence of ‘beautiful’ meaning
beautiful to Mary and Beatrice and the latter occurrence of ‘beautiful’ meaning beauti-
ful to John. Yet, it dicult to hear a reading of (21) with the occurrences of beautiful
completed in such a manner.
Crucially, NIC can make sense of (20) and (21). According to NIC all occurrences of ‘tasty’
and ‘beautiful’ have the same semantic content. More so, the propositions expressed
by (20) and (21) are evaluated for truth with John providing the relevant taste. Clearly,
the semantics provided by NIC does not permit John to believe that the propositions
expressed by (20) and (21) are true. Since (20) and (21) are not true, they are not assertible
either.
2.3 Disagreeing about Matters of Taste
Suppose that Mary and John are listening to the 1812 Overture by Tchaikovsky and that
midway in the composition they have the following dialogue:
(22) a. Mary: Tchaikovsky composed the 1812 Overture.
b. John: Yes he did.
The dialogue between Mary and John in (22) is a clear case of agreement. A simple
explanation of the agreement in (22) can be provided by saying that there is a proposition,
the proposition that Tchaikovsky composed the 1812 Overture and both Mary and John
believe that proposition to be true. Following this line of thought we can describe the
type of agreement illustrated by (22) in the following manner:
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Agree. Two parties agree only if there is a proposition that both parties be-
lieve.
Contrastingly, suppose that instead of (22), Mary and John had the following dialogue:
(23) a. Mary: Stravinsky composed the 1812 Overture.
b. John: I disagree, it was composed by Tchaikovsky.
In (23) Mary and John are clearly disagreeing. The crucial question is: how do we explain
the disagreement? An intuitive rst step towards an explanation is to say that there is
a proposition, the proposition that Stravinsky composed the 1812 Overture and Mary be-
lieves that proposition to be true whilst John believes that proposition to be false. In
addition it seems like one of the disputing parties must be wrong. With our initial obser-
vations in mind we can tentatively describe the type of disagreement illustrated by (23)
in the following manner:
Two parties have an S-type disagreement if there is a proposition p such that
one party believes p and the other party believes ¬p and one party is at fault.
Based on the success of analyzing (23) in terms of S-type disagreement it is natural to
conjecture that all cases of disagreement are cases of S-type disagreement. But consider
that near the end of the 1812 Overture, Mary and John have the following dialogue:
(24) a. Mary: The 1812 Overture by Tchaikovsky is a beautiful piece of music.
b. John: I disagree, the 1812 Overture is overly romantic.
Is there S-type disagreement in (24)? In (24) there seems to be a proposition that Mary
believes to be true and John believes to be false. Yet, (24) diers from (23) in that no party
seems to be making a mistake. It would certainly be odd to claim that John is at out mak-
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ing a mistake by nding the composition overly romantic. Conversely it would be odd to
say that Mary is making a at out mistake in nding the composition beautiful. Hence,
it could be argued that (24) exhibits a kind of faultless or F-type disagreement:
Two parties have an F-type disagreement if there is a proposition p such that
one party believes p and the other party believes ¬p and no party is at fault.
With such considerations in mind we can reformulate our question and ask: is there S or
F-type disagreement in (24)? At any rate, the contextualist semantics makes it dicult
to explain the disagreement in (24). Both S and F-type disagreement requires that there
is a proposition Mary believes and John disbelieves. However, on the contextualist view
Mary is expressing the proposition that the 1812 Overture is beautiful to her, and John
is expressing the proposition that 1812 Overture is not beautiful to him. On the contex-
tualist semantics then, there is no S or F-type disagreement in (24) because there is no
proposition that Mary believes and John disbelieves. Hence, contextualism is prone to
the following argument:
(1). The parties have an S or F-type disagreement. (Ass).
(2). If the parties have an S or F-type disagreement, there is a proposition such
that one party believes that proposition and the other believes its negation.
(Ass).
(3). If contextualism is true, there is not a proposition such that one party
believes that proposition and the other believes its negation (Ass).
(4). There is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition and
the other believes its negation. (from (1) and (2) by modus ponens).
(5). Therefore, contextualism is not true. (from (3) and (4) by modus tollens).9
9This is a modied argument found in Huvenes 2012a: 19-20.
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The problem of lost disagreement comes with a corresponding problem of lost agreement.
Consider the following case:
(25) a. Mary: Grapes are tasty.
b. John: I agree, Grapes are tasty.
c. i. Mary: The 1812 Overture is beautiful.
ii. John: I agree, the 1812 Overture is beautiful.
As in the case of disagreement, the contextualist semantics makes it dicult to account
for the agreement in (25). If Mary in (25a) expresses the proposition that grapes are tasty
to her and John in (25b) expresses the proposition that grapes are tasty to him, Mary and
John do not agree in (25a)-(25b), they simply believe two dierent propositions. The same
goes for (25c-i)-(25c-ii). If contextualism is to be a viable semantic theory for the predi-
cates of personal taste, the challenges we have mapped out must be answered. How can
the contextualist respond? Roughly, there are two main options available to the contex-
tualist. The rst option is to argue that despite appearances there are no disagreements
in discourse about matters of taste. Instead of disagreeing, two parties who engage in a
dispute about matters of taste are merely talking past each other. That is, they are are
having a verbal dispute. The second option available to the contextualist is to argue that
despite some initial challenges contextualism can indeed accommodate disagreement in
discourse about taste. We are going to explore both options in turn.
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2.4 Abandoning the Doxastic View
Our previous discussion about S and F-type disagreement has implicitly assumed a con-
ception of disagreement that Tornn Huvenes has coined the doxastic view.10 According
to Huvenes the main tenets of the doxastic view can be illustrated by the conjunction of
T1-T4:
T1. Whether two parties agree or disagree is always a matter of which propo-
sitions they believe.
T2. The objects of agreement and disagreement are propositions.
T3. Two parties agree only if there is a proposition that both parties believe.
T4. Two parties disagree only if there is a proposition p such that one party
believes p and the other party believes ¬p.11
After identifying the core tenets of the doxastic view as T1-T4 Huvenes argues that one of
the most promising contextualist responses to the problem of lost disagreement is to re-
ject T1-T4 and opt for a reconception of what it takes for two parties to disagree. Roughly,
the idea is that instead of taking two parties to disagree only if there is a proposition p
such that one party believes p and the other party believes ¬p, we should draw on the
ideas of Charles Leslie Stevenson and take two parties to disagree if they have conicting
attitudes.12 Following this line of thought Huvenes suggests that we reject the doxastic
view of disagreement in favor of the following three theses:
Ta. Two parties agree just in case they have converging attitudes.
Tb. Two parties disagree just in case they have conicting attitudes.
10Huvenes 2012a: 52.
11Huvenes 2012a: 52.
12Huvenes 2012a: 46. For Stevenson’s view see Stevenson 1937, 1944 and 1966.
28
Chapter 2. Contextualism versus NIC
Tc. There is convergence and conict among a wide range of attitudes that
includes both doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes.13
Let us refer to the conjunction of Ta-Tb as the A-view of disagreement. According to the
A-view we can disagree by having conicting purposes, aspirations, wants, preferences,
desires, hopes, etc.14 With this conception of disagreement in mind, consider a dialogue
concerning matters of taste:
(26) a. Mary: Dates are tasty.
b. John: I disagree, dates are too sweet.
After the reconception of what it takes for two parties to disagree, the contextualist can
argue that the parties in (26) are disagreeing because they have conicting non-doxastic
attitudes concerning the dates. This way of thinking about disagreement lends itself most
easily to the view that the parties in (26) are not making any mistakes by having the non-
doxastic attitudes they have.15 Thus, contextualism can predict that the speakers in (26)
have a kind of F-type disagreement.
At this point the contextualist has to show that the A-view is preferable to the doxastic
view as an overall framework for thinking about disagreement. Otherwise, we would
lack proper motivation to abandon the doxastic view of disagreement in favor of the A-
view. In order to show that the A-view is preferable to the doxastic view Huvenes asks
us to consider the following semantic data:
(27) a. Mary: I like this chili.
13Huvenes 2012a: 68.
14Huvenes 2012a: 68. Huvenes 2014: 147.
15Huvenes 2012a: 74.
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b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.16
(28) a. Mary: I like Dave’s curry.
b. John: I dislike Dave’s curry.17
(29) a. Mary: I want to go to the movies.
b. John: No I would rather stay at home.18
Furthermore we have to make the following assumption about the data above:
(Ass). The parties in (27), (28) and (29) disagree.
Here is the potential problem for the doxastic view. In (27), (28) and (29) there appears
to be no proposition that one party believes and the other party believes the negation of
that proposition. Hence, on the assumption that the parties in (27), (28) and (29) disagree,
the doxastic view leads to a case of lost disagreement because the parties do not hold
conicting beliefs. Conversely, proponents of the A-view can easily explain how the
parties in (27), (28) and (29) disagree. In (27) Mary and John disagree by virtue of having
conicting attitudes towards the chili, in (28) they disagree by having conicting attitudes
about the curry and in (29) they disagree by having conicting attitudes about going to
the movies. Thus, if we assume that the parties in (27), (28) and (29) are disagreeing, the
A-view has signicant advantages over the doxastic view.
How can a proponent of NIC respond to the argument above? First, it is important to
appreciate that I am open to the idea that speakers can disagree by virtue of having
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from the doxastic view to the A-view for the sake of this discussion. Thus, I concede
that contextualists can explain the possibility of non-doxastic disagreement in discourse
about taste. However, embracing the A-view might not vindicate contextualism from all
charges concerning disagreement. There is still a potential worry that the disagreements
in discourse about matters of taste concern the beliefs of the disputing parties. If this
worry is legitimate, contextualists still owe us an explanation of how two parties can
disagree by virtue of having conicting beliefs about some matter of taste.
The line of argumentation that I have outlined above has been embraced by John Mac-
Farlane.19 MacFarlane maintains the view that speakers can disagree by virtue of having
conicting non-doxastic attitudes, but he also maintains that the disagreements that oc-
cur in discourse about matters of taste appear to be concerned with both non-doxastic and
doxastic attitudes.20 In order to procure evidence in favor of the view that two speakers
can disagree by virtue of having conicting beliefs about some matter of taste, MacFar-
lane considers data where speakers express disagreement about matters of taste by using
disagreement markers like ‘I don’t believe that’ and ‘That is not true’. The point is that
the pronoun ‘that’ used in these disagreement markers is usually anaphoric referring to
a previously expressed proposition which suggests that the ensuing disagreement con-
cerns the beliefs held by the disputing parties.21 With the latter remarks in mind, consider
the following dialogue:
(30) a. Mary: Sushi is tasty.
b. John option 1: I don’t believe that.
c. John option 2: That is not true.
19MacFarlane 2009: 15.
20MacFarlane 2009: 7-15. See also, MacFarlane 2014: 131-136.
21MacFarlane 2009: 7-15. Peter Lasersohn makes a similar point, see, Lasersohn 2005: 657.
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First, we have to notice that John’s reply in (30b) concerns belief. Consequently, it is
natural to assume that the demonstrative ‘that’ featuring in (30b) refers to the proposition
expressed by Mary in (30a). Similarly, John’s reply in (30c) concerns truth. Consequently,
it is natural to assume that John’s use of ‘that’ in (30c) refers to the proposition expressed
by Mary in (30a). If both (30b) and (30c) contains a reference to the proposition that Mary
expresses in (30a) it becomes dicult not to interpret the disagreement between Mary
and John as a disagreement concerning belief.
How can the contextualist explain the doxastic disagreement in (30)? Neither the A-view,
nor the contextualist semantics appear to oer the apparatus needed to explain doxastic
disagreement. It seems then, that even when we embrace the A-view contextualists have
a hard time accommodating examples like (30). However, not all contextualists accept
that the data in (30) is legitimate. For example, Huvenes has pointed out is that it is not
entirely clear that it is appropriate to use disagreement markers like ‘That is not true’
when expressing disagreement about matters of taste. 22 To appreciate the point made
by Huvenes we have to compare the felicity of the disagreement markers in (31b) and
(31c):
(31) a. Mary: Sushi is tasty.
b. John option 1: I disagree, sushi is not tasty. 23
c. John option 2: That is not true, sushi is not tasty. 24
According to Huvenes the use of ‘I disagree’ in (31b) appears to be felicitous whereas the
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the view that the parties in (31a) have a disagreement in belief because a disagreement
in belief should allow both (31b) and (31c) to be felicitous.
I agree with Huvenes that when the data in (31) is taken at face value the use of ‘That
is not true’ in (31c) comes out somewhat stilted. Nonetheless, I contend that once we
take into consideration a larger set of data there appears to be many cases were it is
appropriate to use ‘That is not true’ in order to express disagreement about some matter
of taste. Consider a context where John has been practicing his drawing skills. Mary
nds John’s drawings beautiful whereas John is dissatised about the result. With this
context in mind consider the following dialogue:
(32) a. John: My drawings are terrible.
b. Mary: That is not true, your drawings are beautiful.
In (32a) Johns asserts that he nds his own drawings terrible and as far as I can tell it is
natural for Mary to use ‘That is not true’ in order to express her disagreement with what
John asserted. It it also worth considering an alternative dialogue set in the same context
as before:
(33) a. Mary: Your drawings are beautiful.
b. John: That is not true, they are not very good.
In (33a) Mary asserts that John’s drawings are beautiful. Once we keep in mind that John
is quite disappointed with his drawings John’s use of ‘That is not true’ in (33b) appears
to be an appropriate response to Mary’s assertion.
It is not hard to nd similar cases involving uses of ‘tasty’ instead of ‘beautiful’. Consider
a context where John has baked some pastry. Mary likes the taste of the pastry whereas
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John nds the avor disappointing. With this context in mind consider the following
dialogue:
(34) a. John: My pastry is terrible.
b. Mary: That is not true, your pastry is very tasty.
In this case too Mary’s expression of disagreement in (34b) appears to be appropriate as
a response to what John said in (31c).
Up until now we have been considering dialogues where the disagreement marker ‘That
is not true’ is used directly as a response to a declarative sentence. It might be useful
to take into consideration some more complex dialogues that contain optative and in-
terrogative sentences in addition to declarative sentences. First, consider a dialogue that
contains an optative:
(35) a. Mary: Your drawings are beautiful.
b. John: If only that were true.
In (35a) Mary asserts that she nds John’s drawings beautiful. In (35b) John is expressing
his wish that the proposition Mary asserted in (35a) were true. By expressing this wish
John is also disagreeing with what Mary asserted.
Finally, consider the following disagreement which is instigated by the interrogative sen-
tence in (36a):
(36) a. Mary: Is it true that Steve’s pastry is tasty?
b. John: Sure, Steve’s pastry is tasty.
c. Tom: That is not true, Steve’s pastry is horrible.
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In (36a) Mary is explicitly querying whether the proposition that Steve’s pastry is tasty
is true. Thus, it is dicult to make sense of the ensuing disagreement between John and
Tom as anything but a disagreement concerning the truth of the proposition that Steve’s
pastry is tasty.
Let us take stock at this point. We have tentatively embraced the A-view of disagree-
ment. That is, the view that two parties can disagree by having conicting attitudes. By
embracing the doxastic view it becomes possible for contextualists to explain how there
can be non-doxastic disagreements about matters of taste. On the other hand, the A-view
might not vindicate contextualism from all charges concerning disagreement. We have
seen that there are cases where the parties appear to disagree by virtue of having conict-
ing beliefs about some matter of taste. If this data is legitimate, contextualists are prone
to the following argument regardless of whether the A-view holds good or not:
(1). The parties in (32)-(36) have a doxastic disagreement. (Ass).
(2). If the parties in (32)-(36) are having a doxastic disagreement, there is
a proposition such that one party believes that proposition and the other
believes its negation. (Ass).
(3). If contextualism is true, there is not a proposition such that one party
believes that proposition and the other believes its negation (Ass).
(4). There is a proposition such that one party believes that proposition and
the other believes its negation. (from (1) and (2) by modus ponens).
(5). Therefore, contextualism is not true. (from (3) and (4) by modus tollens).26
Thus, it appears that contextualists still owe us an explanation of how there can be dox-
astic disagreement in discourse about taste.
26This is a modied argument found in Huvenes 2012a: 19-20.
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2.5 Extension to Expressivism
Up until now I have argued that contextualists cannot provide a satisfactory account of
disagreement. Insofar as expressivism is a parsimonious alternative to contextualism, it
is worthwhile to show that expressivists face similar problems concerning disagreement
as contextualists.
Traditionally, expressivism has mostly been defended as a thesis about moral expressions.
Because of this, I start out by exploring what it is to be an expressivist about moral
language and then I extend the treatment to discourse about taste.
Consider the following sentence:
(37) You acted wrongly in stealing that money.
It is useful to conceive of expressivism as a bipartite theory. First, there is the negative
claim that sentences like (37) do not express truth apt propositions.27 Second, there is the
positive claim that the primary function of sentences like (37) is to express attitudes.28
Roughly, these two claims make up the core of the classical expressivism espaused by A.
J. Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic:
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual
content. Thus if I say to someone, ‘You acted wrongly in stealing that money,’
I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You stole that
money.’ In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further
statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as
27Jackson and Pettit 1998: 239.
28Jackson and Pettit 1998: 239.
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if I had said, ‘You stole that money,’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it
with the addition of some special exclamation marks.29
Considerations about disagreement plays an important role as motivation for expres-
sivism. In particular, expressivists have put much weight on the claim that endorsing
expressivism makes it possible to explain why disagreements about moral issues are per-
sistent.30 Consider the following dialogue:
(38) a. Mary: Stealing the apples is immoral.
b. John: I disagree, stealing the apples is not immoral.
According to expressivists the parties in (38) might agree about all the facts concerning
the stealing of the apples. For example, they might agree about how stealing the apples
will aect the happiness of the relevant parties, they might agree about the potential
societal impact of the theft etc. But even though the parties in (38) agree about all the
relevant facts, they seem to disagree about whether or not the act of stealing the apples
is immoral. Expressivists take this to suggest that Mary and John are not expressing any
factual claims in (38).31 Clearly, if the parties in (38) are not making any factual claims,
we cannot explain the disagreement in (38) as a matter of what propositions the parties
in (38) believe. Thus, in order to explain why the parties in (38) are disagreeing most
expressivists endorse Charles Leslie Stevenson’s idea that there can be disagreement in
attitude:
Two men will be said to disagree in attitude when they have opposed at-
titudes to the same object|one approving of it, for instance, and the other
29Ayer 1959: 107.
30Jackson and Pettit 1998: 249-250.
31Jackson and Pettit 1998: 250.
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disapproving of it and when at least one of them has a motive for altering or
calling into question the attitude of the other.32
The idea then, is that the parties in (38) are disagreeing by virtue of having conicting
non-doxastic attitudes about stealing. Recall that in §2.4 I suggested that we ought to
tentatively embrace the A-view of disagreement. Therefore we should readily concede
that contextualists have the conceptual apparatus to legitimately claim that the parties
in (38) are disagreeing by virtue of having conicting non-doxastic attitudes about steal-
ing.
We can now turn our attention to the following question: can expressivists explain the
possibility of disagreement in discourse about matters of taste? To answer our ques-
tion we must rst extend our outline of classical expressivism for moral vocabulary to
discourse about taste. Consider the following sentences:
(39) Carrots are tasty.
(40) Rivers are beautiful.
Transferring the negative claim of classical expressivism to (39)-(40) we get the result
that uses of (39)-(40) do not express any truth apt semantic content. Transferring the
positive claim of classical expressivism to (39)-(40) we get the result that uses of (39)-(40)
serve to express attitudes, much in the same manner as smacking one’s lips after a meal
expresses one’s attitudes without reporting one’s attitudes.33With these remarks about
(39)-(40) in mind, consider the following dialogues:
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b. John: I disagree, they are too bland.
In order to explain the disagreement in (41) expressivists can contend that the parties in
(41) are disagreeing by virtue of having conicting non-doxastic attitudes towards the
carrots.
However, expressivists just like contextualists have problems explaining the disagree-
ment present in the following dialogues:
(42) a. John: My drawings are terrible.
b. Mary: That is not true, your drawings are beautiful.
(43) a. Mary: Your pastry is tasty.
b. John: Unfortunately, that is not true.
(44) a. Mary: Your drawings are beautiful.
b. John: That is not true, they are not very good.
According to expressivists the utterances in (42a), (43a) and (44a) express but do not re-
port the attitudes of the speakers. On this view then, the pronoun ‘that’ used in (42b),
(43b) and (44b) is anaphoric referring to the attitudes previously expressed. This is prob-
lematic for the expressivist because we do not usually ascribe truth or falsity to non-
doxastic attitudes.
It is also worth taking into consideration that the same problems are present in more
exotic examples. an optative sentence:
(45) a. Mary: Your drawings are beautiful.
b. John: If only that were true.
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According to expressivists Mary’s utterance in (45a) is expressing but not reporting her
positive attitude towards John’s drawings. Thus, John’s use of the pronoun ‘that’ in (45b)
is presumably anaphoric referring to Mary’s non-doxastic attitude. But again, this does
not sit well with John’s subsequent use of ‘true’. We do not ordinarily call non-doxastic
attitudes true.
Finally, consider the following disagreement which is instigated by the interrogative sen-
tence in (46a):
(46) a. Mary: Is it true that Steve’s pastry is tasty?
b. John: Sure, Steve’s pastry is tasty.
c. Tom: That is not true, Steve’s pastry is horrible.
In (46a) it is explicit that Mary’s question concerns truth. But it is dicult to make sense
of Mary’s question and the ensuing disagreement between John and Tom if we take uses
of ‘tasty’ to merely express ones attitude. Hence, expressivism in its traditional form has
a hard time explaining discourse about matters of taste.
Of course, modern expressivists have developed more sophisticated versions of expres-
sivism. In particular, the expressivist positions endorsed by Simon Blackburn and Allan
Gibbard have given much traction to expressivism in the contemporary debate about
moral discourse.34 Nonetheless, I do not know of any prominent attempt to extend the
ideas of Gibbard or Blackburn from moral discourse to discourse about taste. It remains
to be seen then, whether modern expressivists can produce the apparatus needed to oer
a satisfactory account of the disagreement cases that we have considered above.
34Blackburn 1984, 1998. Gibbard 1990, 2003.
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2.6 No Disagreement After All?
Some contextualists contend that despite initial appearances, we cannot disagree about
matters of taste. Thus, when two parties are having a dispute about taste, there is no
disagreement, but what we might loosely refer to as a verbal dispute. With this in mind,
consider the following example:
(47) a. Mary: Licorice is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, licorice is not tasty.
According to Jonathan Schaer the parties in (47) do not disagree.35 Rather, the parties in
(47) are engaged in a verbal dispute. The idea is that the dispute in (47) is verbal because
Mary can resolve the dispute in the following manner:
(48) a. Mary: Licorice is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, licorice is not tasty.
c. Mary: Listen, I was just saying that I like it.36
Clearly, the idea that the dispute in (47) can be resolved in the manner illustrated by the
dialogue in (48) sits well with the semantics oered by contextualism. On the contextual-
ist view the proposition expressed by Mary in (48a) is the proposition that licorice is tasty
to Mary. Because Mary is only talking about herself in (48a) John’s response in (48b) is
inappropriate with respect to the proposition expressed by Mary. Consequently, Mary
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I agree with Schaer that the parties in (47) can hardly be said to disagree if the dispute
between them can be resolved in the manner illustrated by (48). However, there are some
issues with the contention that the dialogue in (48) illustrates a potential resolution to
the dispute in (47). First, if we assume that both contextualism and the the A-view of
disagreement are correct, we get the result that the parties in (48) disagree by virtue
of having conicting non-doxastic attitudes towards the taste of licorice. This would
make John’s use of the disagreement marker ‘I disagree’ in (48c) legitimate because the
parties would be engaged in a non-doxastic disagreement. Moreover, Mary’s attempt to
resolve the dispute in (48c) would fail because the dispute between the parties does not
concern the propositions that the parties believe. Thus, the resolution in (48) appears to
be illegitimate on the A-view of disagreement. Second, regardless of what conception of
disagreement we operate with, there are some worries about the felicity of the resolution
in (48). In order to illustrate why the resolution in (48) might not be felicitous it is useful
to explore some dialogues that can easily be resolved through linguistic clarication.
For example, everybody can agree that the parties in (49) are merely talking past each
other:
(49) a. Mary: I am a doctor.
b. John: I disagree, I am not a doctor.37
Consequently, it is also fairly easy to recognize that the dispute in (49) can be resolved
in the following manner:
(50) a. Mary: I am a doctor.
b. John: I disagree, I am not a doctor.
c. Mary: Listen, I only said that I am a doctor.
37Huvenes 2012b: 170.
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By using (50c) Mary points out that she was only talking about herself in (50a), and that
John’s response in (50b) is out of place relative to what Mary said in (50a). Now then, if
the parties in (47) are talking past each other in the same manner as the parties in (49)
are talking past each other, then it ought to be fairly easy to recognize that the dispute
in (47) is resolvable too. But this appears not to be the case. On the contrary, whilst it is
fairly easy to see that Mary’s use of (50c) resolves the dispute in (50), it is not at all clear
that the dispute in (47) can be resolved in the following manner:
(51) a. Mary: Licorice is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, licorice is not tasty.
c. Mary: Listen, I was just saying that I like it.
This is a problem for the contextualist, because if contextualism is true, there should be
little doubt amongst competent speakers that the dialogue in (51) is felicitous. At the very
least it seems that the contextualist owes us an explanation of why there is a signicant
discrepancy between the felicity of (50c) and (51c).
2.6.1 More Data
Consider another dialogue where the parties are clearly talking past each other:
(52) a. Mary: I solved the riddle.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hard for me.
Because Mary is only talking about herself in (52a) it is fairly easy appreciate that Mary
can resolve the dispute in (52) in the following manner:
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(53) a. Mary: I solved the riddle.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hard for me.
c. Mary: Listen, I just said that I solved the riddle.
What I would like to draw attention to is that Mary’s response in (53c) is really a speech
report of what Mary said in (53a). Furthermore, accurate speech reports tend to block
objections to their accuracy. Just notice how the following objection to the speech report
in (53c) is out of place:
(54) John: No, you didn’t say that.
Naturally the latter contention holds good in discourse about matters of taste too:
(55) a. Mary: I like chili.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot for me.
c. Mary: Listen, I only said that I like chili.
What Mary says in (55c) is true. That is, in (55c) Mary accurately reports that she was
only talking about herself in (55a). Thus, it is clear that John cannot reply to what Mary
is saying in (55c) with the following objection:
(56) John: No, you didn’t say that.
Finally, consider the following dialogue:
(57) a. Mary: Chili is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, it’s too hot.
c. Mary: Listen, I only said that chili is tasty to me.
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Here is the problem for the contextualist. If we assume that the contextualist semantics
is true, then Mary’s use of (57a) would roughly express the proposition that chili is tasty
for Mary. On the contextualist view then, Mary’s report in (57c) should be true because
she was indeed talking about herself in (57a). Thus, we should expect the speech report
in (57c) to bar objections to its accuracy just as easily as (53c) and (55c) bars objections
to their accuracy. However, it is not entirely clear that (57c) bars the following objec-
tion:
(58) John: No, you didn’t say that.
In fact, I contend that the objection in (58) appears to be legitimate. At the very least It
seems that the contextualist owes us an explanation of why the speech report in (57c)
does not bar objections to its truth just as as easily as other true speech reports.
2.7 Reporting Disagreement
Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne contend that there can hardly be such a thing as
a disagreement about matters of taste:
We want to emphasize one nal point about generics: the literature tends to
proceed as if we generally intuit a disagreement when one person utters a
generic claim of the sort ‘Fs are fun’ (or ‘Doing G is fun’) and another person
utters ‘Fs are not fun’ (or ‘Doing G is not fun’). But this is just not right.
It is not hard at all to come up with cases where two people utter a pair
of judgements of this form, but there is no sense of disagreement between
them.38
38Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 113.
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The main argument they advance in favor of their view starts out by making the assump-
tion that we are fairly procient at reporting when two parties disagree. For example,
consider the following case of disagreement:
(59) a. Mary: Earth is at.
b. John: I disagree, Earth isn’t at.
According to Cappelen and Hawthorne it is easy to see that a third party could report on
Mary and John’s dispute in the following manner:
(60) Mary and John disagree whether Earth is at.39
Because it is easy to see that the report in (60) is true, Cappelen and Hawthorne propose
to use reports like (60) to test whether two parties disagree.40 With these considerations
in mind, consider the following dialogue:
(61) a. Mary: Sushi is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, sushi is awful.
According to Cappelen and Hawthorne we should intuit that a third party could not
report on Mary and John’s dispute in the following manner:
(62) Mary and John disagree whether sushi is tasty.41
Certainly, if virtually everyone in the debate shared Cappelen and Hawthorne’s intuition
that the report in (62) is false, our intuitions about reports like (62) could be considered
39Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 55-56.
40Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 54-57.
41Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009: 113.
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as a powerful diagnostics for disagreement. However, far from everyone share Cappelen
and Hawthorne’s intuition that (62) is false. As far as I can tell (62) is just as felicitous
as (60). At the very least contextualists should concede that there is a large discrepancy
between the dialogue in (61) and the dialogue in (63):
(63) a. Mary: I am a doctor.
b. John: I disagree, I am not a doctor.42
In (63) we immediately recognize that the parties are not disagreeing. By extension, we
have no trouble recognizing that a third party could not correctly report that:
Mary and John disagree whether Mary is a doctor.
Because our intuitions about (62) are greatly divergent, it is dicult to use our intuitions
about examples like (62) as evidence without being overly chauvinistic. Thus, I am not
going to argue that raw intuitions about the felicity of reports like (62) provide weighty
evidence for or against any semantic theory. Instead, I contend that we can gain some
traction if we focus on the consequences owing from Cappelen and Hawthorne’s con-
tention that the parties in (61) are not disagreeing.
First, assume for the sake of argument, that exible contextualism provides a correct se-
mantic theory for the predicates of taste. Second, assume that there is no such thing as
disagreement in discourse about matters of taste. Finally, assume that John in (61) is a
competent speaker of English. With our assumptions in mind, it seems that John, by
virtue of his linguistic competence, should easily acknowledge that Mary is only talk-
ing about herself in (61a) and that his use of the disagreement marker ‘I disagree’ in
(61a) is inappropriate relative to what Mary said. The problem for contextualists is that
42Huvenes 2012b: 170.
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fully competent speakers of English frequently engage in dialogues like (61). Why would
speakers frequently engage in dialogues like (61) if their semantic competence makes
them able to acknowledge that they are merely talking past each other? To me it seems
implausible that there should be such widespread systematic error on behalf of competent
speakers.
2.8 Making Sense of F-type Disagreement
We have seen that contextualists can oer an explanation of how there can be non-
doxastic disagreements in discourse about matters of taste by embracing the A-view of
disagreement. But capturing non-doxastic disagreement might not be enough to vindi-
cate contextualism form all charges concerning disagreement. We have explored data
which suggests that speakers frequently use the disagreement markers ‘That is not true’
and ‘I don’t believe that’ to express disagreement about some matter of taste. The use of
such disagreement markers does not sit well with the contention that the disagreements
present in discourse about taste are merely non-doxastic. Rather, the use of such dis-
agreement markers suggest that at least some of the disagreements present in discourse
about taste concern the beliefs of the disputing parties. Thus, a satisfactory account of
disagreement should explain how two parties can disagree by virtue of having conicting
beliefs about some matter of taste.
I am going to embrace the view that there is F-type disagreement in discourse about
matters of taste. However, I readily admit, that at rst sight it is not clear whether F-type
disagreement is a potential benet or a potential worry. Can it be the case that one party
believes p and another party believes ¬p and yet no party is making any kind of mistake?
Here is Michael Glanzberg’s verdict on the possibility of F-type disagreement:
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From a traditional, non-relativist, point of view, this idea is prima facie ab-
surd: if two propositions express disagreement, one must fail to be correct.
Of course, this absurdity ows from theoretical commitments of the tradi-
tional view, and any such theory must give way in the face of compelling
evidence against it.43
As far as I can tell Glanzberg gets to the core of the issue concerning F-type disagree-
ment. If we presuppose a traditional point of view, that is, a semantic theory whereupon
propositions are true or false simpliciter, it is no wonder that the notion of F-type dis-
agreement comes out as absurd. Hence, I completely agree with Glanzberg’s verdict that
the absurdity of F-type disagreement ows from the traditional point of view. However,
the upshot is that the coherence of F-type disagreement turns on ones choice of seman-
tic theory and NIC seems to be a promising semantic theory to adopt if one wishes to
make sense of the phenomena of disagreement in discourse about matters of taste. How
then, can we cash out a sensible account of F-type disagreement? Consider the following
disagreement data:
(64) a. Mary: Grapes are tasty.
b. John: I disagree, grapes are not tasty.
We start by putting the thin semantic content oered by NIC to work. According to NIC
the proposition expressed by (64a) is the proposition that grapes are tasty. Mary believes
that proposition to be true whilst John believes the negation of that proposition. At this
point it clear that the parties in (64) hold conicting beliefs insofar as John cannot come
to believe what Mary believes without giving up his own belief. It is precisely because
the parties hold noncotenable beliefs that the parties can be said to disagree at all. Yet,
43Glanzberg 2007: 16.
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we want to make sense of the view that no party is at fault despite of their conicting
beliefs. We shall capture the faultless part by deploying the following denition of accu-
racy:
Accuracy. A belief or assertion occurring at C is accurate, just in case its
content is true as used at C.
On this view, Mary’s belief at C that grapes are tasty can be accurate with respect to
C whereas John’s belief at C’ that grapes are not tasty can be accurate with respect to
C’. Our notion of accuracy makes it clear that the parties in (64) are faultless by virtue of
having accurate beliefs. More so, we are now in a position to shed our previous denition
of F-type disagreement in favor of the following one:
Two parties have an F-type disagreement only if (A) there is a proposition
p such that one party believes p and the other party believes ¬p and (B) the
beliefs can both be accurate.
Similarly, we can shed our previous denition of S-type disagreement in favor of the
following one:
Two parties have an S-type disagreement only if (A) there is a proposition
p such that one party believes p and the other party believes ¬p and (B) the
beliefs cannot both be accurate.
The account of S and F-type disagreement given above provides NIC with considerable
explanatory power. For example, NIC oers a ne grained explanation of the dierence
between the disagreements in the following dialogues:
(65) a. Mary: The 1812 Overture is written by Tchaikovsky.
b. John: No, it is written by Stravinsky.
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c. i. Mary: The 1812 Overture is beautiful.
ii. John: I disagree, it is awful.
Our denition of S-type disagreement makes it clear that one party in (65a)-(65b) must
be at fault because their beliefs cannot both be accurate. Conversely, our denition of
F-type disagreement makes it clear that no party in (65c-i)-(65c-ii) is at fault because the
beliefs of both parties can both be accurate. Furthermore, recall that contextualists and
expressivists had problems with disagreement data featuring disagreement markers like
‘That is not true’ and ‘I don’t believe that’. It is worth pointing out that the account of dis-
agreement presented above can circumvent these issues. Consider these dialogues:
(66) a. John: My drawings are terrible.
b. Mary: That is not true, your drawings are beautiful.
(67) a. Mary: Your pastry is tasty.
b. John: Unfortunately, that is not true.
(68) a. Mary: Your drawings are beautiful.
b. John: That is not true, they are not very good.
According to NIC (66a) expresses the proposition that John’s drawings are terrible, (67a)
expresses the proposition that John’s pastry is tasty and (68a) expresses the proposition
that John’s drawings are beautiful. On this view, the use of the disagreement marker ‘That
is not true’ in (66b), (67b) and (68b) makes sense because the pronoun ‘the’ is anaphoric
referring to the propositions previously expressed in the dialogue.
It is also worth taking into consideration some dialogues featuring non-declarative sen-
tences. For example, an optative:
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(69) a. Mary: Your drawings are beautiful.
b. John: If only that were true.
According to NIC Mary’s utterance in (69a) expresses the proposition that John’s draw-
ings are beautiful. In (69b) John is expressing his wish that the proposition Mary previ-
ously expressed in (69a) were true. By expressing this wish John is also disagreeing with
what Mary asserted.
Finally, consider the following disagreement which is instigated by the interrogative sen-
tence in (70a):
(70) a. Mary: Is it true that Steve’s pastry is tasty?
b. John: Sure, Steve’s pastry is tasty.
c. Tom: That is not true, Steve’s pastry is horrible.
In (70a) Mary is explicitly querying whether the proposition that Steve’s pastry is tasty is
true. In (70b) John asserts the proposition that Steve’s pastry is tasty. Tom’s use of ‘That
is not true’ in (70c) targets the proposition previously expressed by John in (70b).
We have now seen how our notion of accuracy impacts our construal of S and F-type
disagreement. We can now explore what consequences our notion of accuracy has for
agreement. Consider the following case:
(71) a. Mary: The 1812 Overture is written by Tchaikovsky.
b. John: I agree.
c. i. Mary: The 1812 Overture is beautiful.
ii. John: I agree.
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To me it is clear that the agreement in (71a)-(71b) diers from the agreement in (71c-i)-
(71c-ii). In (71a)-(71b) both Mary and John believe the proposition that the 1812 Overture
is written by Tchaikovsky and the accuracy of their beliefs depend on the world of Mary
and John (assuming that they occupy the same world). Following this line of thought we
can dene the type of agreement illustrated by (71a)-(71b) in the following manner:
Two parties have a C-type agreement only if (A) there is a proposition that
both parties believe and (B) the accuracy of both beliefs depend on the same
circumstance of evaluation.
In (71c-i)-(71c-ii) Mary and John believe the proposition that the 1812 Overture is beautiful,
but the accuracy of their beliefs depend on dierent circumstances of evaluation. The
accuracy of Mary’s belief depends on a circumstance containing Mary’s standard of taste
and the accuracy of John’s belief depends on a circumstance containing John’s standard
of taste. Following this line of thought we can dene the type of agreement illustrated
by (71c-i)-(71c-ii) in the following manner:
Two parties have a P-type agreement only if (A) there is a proposition that
both parties believe and (B) the accuracy of the beliefs depend on dierent
circumstances of evaluation.
I take the remarks above to suggest that the account of disagreement oered by NIC can
accommodate a fairly complex variety of disagreement data. But before we move on I
would like to shed some thoughts on the disputes or arguments that sometimes occur
when two parties disagree.
First, consider the following S-type disagreement:
(72) a. Mary: The 1812 Overture was written by Stravinsky.
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b. John: I disagree, it was written by Tchaikovsky.
Quite, often the dialogue in (72) will be the beginning of an argument about the author-
ship of the 1812 Overture. Furthermore, it is likely that the outcome of the argument will
be that Mary concedes that she was wrong because Tchaikovsky did in fact write the
1812 Overture. Hence, the arguments that ensue from S-type disagreements are often er-
ror eliminating. In this way these arguments appear to be worthwhile insofar as we want
to eliminate beliefs that represent the world in an inaccurate manner. But in the case of
an F-type disagreement no party is at fault. Thus, there is some pressure to explain why
speakers engage in arguments about taste when no party is at fault in having the beliefs
they have.
Here is what John MacFarlane writes about the interests speakers have when discussing
matters of taste:
We have an interest in sharing standards of taste, senses of humor, and epis-
temic states with those around us. The reasons are dierent in each case. In
the case of humor, we want people to appreciate our jokes, and we want them
to tell jokes we appreciate. In the case of epistemic states, it is manifestly in
our interest to share a picture of the world, and to learn from others when
they know things that we do not.44
I suggest that we follow MacFarlane by assuming that speakers have an interest in having
shared standards of taste and by extension that speakers want to have shared beliefs about
matters of taste. On this view, two parties with noncotenable beliefs about some matter
of taste will tend to argue back and forth in an attempt to sway each other into sharing
the same beliefs. With this in mind consider the following dialogue:
44MacFarlane 2007b: 21-22.
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(73) a. Mary: The 1812 Overture is beautiful piece of music.
b. John: I disagree, its not beautiful at all.
It is not hard to imagine that a dialogue like (73) constitutes the beginning of an argument
about the beauty of the 1812 Overture. For example, Mary could respond to John by
saying ‘But have you noticed the subtleties of the string arrangement or the intricacy of
the rhythm?’. Perhaps this remark is sucient to sway John into conceding that the The
1812 Overture is beautiful. After all, it is not unusual that arguments about taste end up
producing agreement.
2.9 The Objection from Incompleteness
In the previous section we saw that NIC purports to provide a satisfactory account of
disagreement in discourse about taste. A vital component of that account is the idea that
there are propositions that are not only, modally and temporally neutral, but also, taste-
neutral. Positing such propositions makes it possible to say that someone who believes
the proposition that oatmeal is tasty and someone who believes the proposition that oat-
meal is not tasty have a doxastic disagreement by virtue of holding noncotenable beliefs.
However, not all philosophers are willing to countenance widespread propositional neu-
trality. For example, this passage from Frege is often taken to be a rejection of temporally
neutral propositions:
If someone wished to cite, say, ‘The total number of inhabitants of the Ger-
man Empire is 52 000 000’, as a counter-example to the timelessness of thoughts,
I should reply: This sentence is not a complete expression of a thought at all,
since it lacks a time determination. If we add such a determination, for exam-
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ple, ‘at noon on 1 January 1897 by central European time’, then the thought
is either true, in which case it is always, or better, timelessly, true, or it is
false and in that case it is false without qualication.45
In the passage above Frege uses ‘thought’ to mean roughly what we call ‘proposition’.
Hence, the point is that sentences which express insuciently specic contents are in-
complete in the sense that they do not express full blooded propositions. More recently
Kent Bach has argued that sentences containing predicates of taste express a semantic
content that lacks some vital piece of information, necessary to produce a truth evalu-
able proposition.46. If Bach is right we have made a mistake in assuming that the contents
expressed by sentences containing predicates of taste are truth evaluable. We have also
made a mistake in taking such contents to be suitable objects of belief and disagreement.
How can we respond to the objection from incompleteness?
There are at least two worries about the objection from incompleteness. First, John Mac-
Farlane has pointed out that if we accept the view that unspecic contents are incomplete
we will proliferate incompleteness excessively. In order to see why, we can consider the
following example:
(74) Mary: It is zero degrees Celsius.
Even if we take the content expressed by (74) to be it is zero degrees Celsius at the base
of the Eiel Tower at noon local time on 22 February 2005 this content is still modally
neutral and therefore in a sense incomplete. Yet, virtually all prominent semantic theories
take the content expressed by (74) to be modally neutral. Thus, if the objection from
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contents yield incompleteness whilst modally neutral contents remain complete.
Second, the view that sentences containing predicates of taste do not express propositions
do not seem to sit well with the way we talk. Consider the following example:
(75) John: My drawings are terrible.
We have previously seen in §2.4 that speakers routinely respond to assertions of (75) by
saying something like ‘That is not true, your drawings are beautiful’. If (75) does not
express a truth evaluable proposition it would seem that speakers who ascribe truth or
falsity to (75) are somehow unable to recognize that the content expressed by (75) cannot
be true or false. I take it to be unlikely that otherwise competent speakers should be
guilty of such widespread systematic error when talking about matters of taste. With
these considerations in mind I do not believe that the objection from incompleteness
should deter us from positing taste-neutral propositions in order to make sense of the





In the preface to his book Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications John
MacFarlane writes:
Analytic philosophers are now considerably more open to relativism about
truth than they were when I began this project. My initial aim was merely to
place relativist views on the table as real options. Many of those who initially
accused these views of incoherence have come around to regarding them as
merely empirically false.1
MacFarlane is right that relativism about truth has been rejuvenated as a viable position
amongst philosophers. In particular the application of relative truth to areas of natural
language semantics is in vogue. The relativist systems of philosophers such as John Mac-
1MacFarlane 2014: vii.
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Farlane, Peter Lasersohn, Max Kölbel and Tamina Stephenson are all motivated by the
claim that they can do a better job at accommodating the semantic data from discourse
about matters of taste than competing semantic theories.2 For example, relativists are
quick to point out that unlike contextualism, relativism can oer an satisfactory account
of disagreement in discourse about taste. More recently, MacFarlane has argued that his
brand of relativism is necessary in order to oer a satisfactory account of retraction in
discourse about taste. In this chapter my attention will not be directed towards questions
concerning the coherence of relativism. Instead I will explore whether the semantic data
supports the view that the relativist semantics has signicant explanatory benets when
compared to NIC.
In §3.2 I explore Peter Lasersohn’s relativist system. In particular I identify the key areas
where Lasersohn’s system deviates from standard Kaplan-style systems. In §3.3 I show
that Lasersohn’s system is motivated by the claim that it can provide an account of fault-
less disagreement. I then argue that NIC can provide an account of faultless disagreement
at a lower cost by maintaining the orthodox view that the circumstance of the context of
use is the circumstance relevant in order to evaluated sentences for truth. In §3.4 I turn to
Tamina Stephenson’s relativist semantics. Stephenson has drawn attention to disagree-
ment data which she argues that neither the relativist semantics of Lasersohn nor the
semantics oered by NIC suce to accommodate. I object that Stephenson’s interpreta-
tion of the disagreement data is awed. Furthermore, I argue that Stephenson’s relativist
semantics makes wrong predictions about the potential resolvability of disagreements in
discourse about taste. In §3.5 I outline the accounts of assertion given by Lasersohn and
Stephenson and argue that both accounts are associated with potential worries. Further-
more I suggest that the semantics of NIC can be equipped with a pragmatic setup which
2See, MacFarlane 2014, Lasersohn 2005, Kölbel 2002 and Stephenson 2007.
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circumvents the worries associated with the accounts of assertion favored by Lasersohn
and Stephenson.
In §3.6 I explore John MacFarlane’s assessment sensitive relativism. MacFarlane takes
the propositions expressed by sentences containing predicates of taste to be assessment
sensitive. The truth of such propositions depend not only on features of the context of use
but also on features of the context of assessment. In §3.7 I explore MacFarlane’s account
of disagreement. According to MacFarlane the account of disagreement oered by NIC is
too weak insofar as it allows that the beliefs of two disputing parties to both be accurate.
To avoid the latter we should stipulate that it is the taste of the assessor that is relevant
to the accuracy of all beliefs concerning taste. By making this stipulation relativists can
oer an account of disagreement where the beliefs of the disputing parties cannot both
be accurate. However, we have to keep in mind that the beliefs of the disputing parties
remain accurate from a metalinguistic perspective. Thus it is not obvious that capturing
preclusion of joint accuracy in the relativists sense should be considered a desideratum. In
§3.8 I explore MacFarlane’s account of assertion and retraction. According to MacFarlane
a retraction of a previous assertion is obligatory whenever the asserted sentence is not
true at the context of use and the context of assessment. Rival semantic theories cannot
accommodate this commitment to retract. I argue that the relativist account of retraction
does not sit well with the observation that there are competent speakers who do not
recognize that they have a requirement to retract in the cases where the relativists tell us
that a retraction is mandatory.
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3.2 Lasersohn’s Relativism
As with NIC it is useful to consider Lasersohn’s brand of relativism as an expansion of the
system developed by David Kaplan in the paper "Demonstratives".3 Because of this I start
this section by outlining Kaplan’s framework. Then I show in what ways Lasersohn’s
system expands from orthodoxy.
Recall that in Kaplan’s framework expressions are associated with two kinds of meaning.
The rst kind of meaning is called content and it can be represented as a function from
circumstances of evaluation to appropriate extensions. In the case of a sentence the con-
tent is a proposition and its extension at a circumstance of evaluation is a truth value. The
second kind of meaning is called character. The character of an expression determines
its content relative to a context and it can be represented as a function from contexts to
contents. We can illustrate the view above by considering the following sentence:
(76) Picasso is painting.
According to the view above a use of (76) at C would express the proposition that Picasso
is painting. Notice that this proposition is not about any particular world or time. That
is, the proposition expressed by (76) is modally and temporally neutral. Nonetheless,
the proposition in question only has a truth value with respect to a world and time. To
accommodate the modal and temporal neutrality of (76) Kaplan settled on circumstances
of evaluation consisting of 〈w, t〉 pairs where w is a world and t is a time.4
So far we have seen that Kaplan oers a two-stage semantic system. In the rst stage,
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propositions are evaluated for truth with respect to circumstances of evaluation consist-
ing of 〈w, t〉 pairs. But what circumstance of evaluation is relevant when evaluating the
truth of (76) as used at C? Kaplan maintained that the circumstance of the context of use
was the relevant circumstance when evaluating a use of (76) for truth:
If C is a context, then an occurrence of φ in C is true i the content expressed
by φ in this context is true when evaluated with respect to the circumstance
of the context.5
Notice the twofold role played by the context C in Kaplan’s system. First the context
determines the propositional content expressed by a sentence at a context. Subsequently
the context initializes the parameters of the circumstance, setting them to be the circum-
stance of the context.
Now that we have sketched Kaplan’s framework we can explore the adjustments we have
to make in order to obtain the relativist system of Peter Lasersohn. Lasersohn’s starting
point is Kaplan’s distinction between character and content. With this distinction in mind
consider the following sentence:
(77) Oranges are tasty.
Lasersohn takes the content expressed by a use of (77) at C to be the proposition that
Oranges are tasty. This proposition is not only modally and temporally neutral, but also
perspective-neutral. In order to provide a satisfactory semantics for (77) Lasersohn em-
braces Kaplan’s advice that we can add parameters to our circumstances if needed. Laser-
sohn’s choice is to expand Kaplan’s 〈w, t〉 pair into the following triple 〈w, t, j〉 where w
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truth values with respect to world-time-judge triples. The judge parameter diers some-
what from the taste parameter employed by NIC but for the present moment it is fruitful
to think of the judge parameter as doing the same work as the taste parameter we are
already accustomed to. It is clear then, that when we only look at the parameters em-
ployed by NIC and Lasersohn’s relativism there are virtually no important dierences
between the two positions. But when we look at how those parameters are used there
are some crucial dierences. Proponents of NIC dene truth at a context in the following
manner:
An occurrence of φ at C is true i the proposition expressed by φ at C is true
at C, 〈wc, tc, gc〉, where wc is the world of C, tc is the time of C and gc is the
taste of C.
Notice that the context of use has a circumstance determining role in the sense that it
tells us what world, time and taste to look at when evaluating the use of a sentence for
truth. Thus, NIC preserves the circumstance determining role of the context of use that
is prominent in Kaplan’s original framework. Contrastingly, Lasersohn rejects the view
that the situation of utterance picks out a unique judge:
In order to maintain an authentically subjective assignment of truth values to
sentences containing predicates of personal taste, we must allow that the ob-
jective facts of the situation of utterance do not uniquely determine a judge.7
The consequence is that there is no objectively correct judge relative to which we must
evaluate a use of (77) at C. Rather, the judge parameter is pragmatically determined by
the perspective adopted by the assessor. For example, if an assessor evaluates a use of (77)
with herself serving as judge, the assessor adopts an autocentric perspective. According
7Lasersohn 2005: 669.
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to Lasersohn, the autocentric perspective is the perspective most frequently adopted by
assessors. For example, speakers ordinarily adopt the autocentric perspective when they
make assertions. Thus, if a speaker, say Diane, is to make a justied assertion of (77)
it is usually a criteria that the proposition expressed by (77) is true when Diane is the
judge. However, there are situations where speakers might assess and even assert (77)
from an alternative exocentric perspective.8 If an assessor evaluates or asserts (77) with
a salient agent other than herself as judge, the assessor adopts an exocentric perspective.
Finally, Lasersohn maintains that speakers can adopt an acentric perspective where no
particular individual serves as judge. When an assessor takes on the acentric perspective
the proposition expressed by (77) cannot be evaluated for truth:
This accords well with our intuitions, I think; if we adopt an acentric perspec-
tive, we do not regard sentences like ‘Roller coasters are fun’ or ‘The chili is
tasty’ as having denite truth values. Note that despite the fact that an acen-
tric perspective precludes the truth-assessment of such sentences, it does not
render them uninterpretable which is as expected under our formalism, since
the content of such sentences does not vary with the judge.9
Clearly, Lasersohn’s use of the judge parameter breaks with the Kaplan-style semantics
where the context of use always picks out a circumstance of evaluation with a privileged
position when the use of a sentence is to be evaluated for truth. How then, does Laser-
sohn motivate his break with the Kaplan-style framework? This questions serves as the
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3.3 Lasersohn’s Relativism and Disagreement
In the previous section we saw that in Lasersohn’s system the situation of utterance does
not privilege any unique judge when the use of a sentence containing a predicate of
taste is to be evaluated for truth. Instead Lasersohn contends that the judge parameter
is pragmatically determined by the perspectives adopted by the assessors. But how does
Lasersohn motivate his use of the judge parameter?
Consider the following disagreement data:
(78) a. Mary: There are ten strawberries on the table.
b. John: No, there are only nine.
(79) a. Mary: Strawberries are tasty.
b. John: I disagree, strawberries are overly sweet.
Lasersohn contends that the parties in (78) and (79) are disagreeing. Yet, the parties in
(79) are having a dierent kind of disagreement than the parties in (78). In (78) at least
one of the parties are making a mistake whereas no party in (79) seems to be at fault.
Here is how Lasersohn describes the disagreement in (79):
What I would like to suggest is that we rene the notion of disagreement so
that two people can overtly disagree - we might even go so far as to say they
contradict each other - even if both their utterances are true.10
Hence, Lasersohn agrees with us that the parties in (79) are having an F-type disagree-
ment. Furthermore, Lasersohn agrees with us on the overall strategy to pursue in order
to accommodate the F-type disagreement exhibited by (79):
10Lasersohn 2005: 662.
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All we have to do is assign words like fun and tasty the same content relative
to dierent individuals, but contextually relativize the assignment of truth
values to contents, so that the same content may be assigned dierent truth
values relative to dierent individuals. This will allow for the possibility that
two utterances express identical semantic content, but with one of them true
and the other one false. This is not at all hard to work out formally, and in fact
can be implemented in Kaplan’s system with a relatively small adjustment.11
As far as I can tell the strategy described above is more or less the same strategy em-
braced by NIC to make sense of the disagreement exhibited by (79). The problem then, is
that Lasersohn’s approach gives us a more complex semantic machinery that we need in
order to carry out the strategy described above. That is, we do not need the complexity
of Lasersohn’s system in order to accommodate the F-type disagreement in (79). Let’s
consider an example to illustrate the point:
(80) a. Mary: Sushi is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, sushi is not tasty at all.
In Lasersohn’s system the proposition expressed by Mary in (80a) is the proposition that
sushi is tasty. Mary believes that this proposition is true whilst John believes the negation
of that proposition. It is because the semantics oered by Lasersohn allows Mary and
John to hold noncotenable beliefs concerning the taste of sushi that the parties can be
said to have a doxastic disagreement. Furthermore, Lasersohn can capture the intuition
that the disagreement between Mary and John is faultless because the content of Mary’s
belief is true when Mary serves as the relevant judge and the content of John’s belief
is true when John serves as the relevant judge. So far I have no central objections to
11Lasersohn 2005: 662.
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Lasersohn’s approach. However, as we saw in §3.2 Lasersohn goes on to stipulate that
there is no correct judge to look at when we are evaluating the truth of an actual use of
the sentence in (80a). The problem is that this feature of Lasersohn’s system, which is
arguably the system’s most radical deviation from traditional Kaplan-style semantics, is
not necessary in order to give an account of the F-type disagreement between the parties
in (80). NIC maintains the following contention: If a sentence φ is used at a context C
then it is the circumstance of C that is the relevant circumstance in order to evaluate
the truth of φ at C. This feature does not provide an obstacle on the road to handle F-
type disagreement. In NIC it is fully possible to maintain that Mary’s belief at C that
sushi is tasty can be accurate with respect to C, whereas John’s belief at C’ that sushi not
tasty can be accurate with respect to C’. In this way, NIC can give an account of the F-
type disagreement in (80) whilst deviating less from Kaplan’s semantic framework than
Lasersohn’s relativism does.
3.4 Stephenson’s Relativism
In the previous section we saw that both the relativist semantics developed by Peter
Lasersohn and the semantics of NIC provide the apparatus needed to accommodate F-
type disagreement in discourse about taste. In order to adjudicate between the two se-
mantics I suggested that we have a methodological incentive to favor NIC because of
its greater parsimony. However, Tamina Stephenson has drawn attention to disagree-
ment data which she argues that neither NIC nor Lasersohn’s variety of relativism can
accommodate. In order to do better, Stephenson presents an alternative relativist seman-
tics which allegedly oers a correct account of the disagreement data. In this section I
outline Stephenson’s relativist semantics and the disagreement data she takes to favor
67
Chapter 3. Relativism versus NIC
her semantics. I then oer objections to Stephenson’s interpretation of the disagreement
data and argue that Stephenson’s relativist semantics does not oer any benets when it
comes to making sense of disagreement in discourse about taste.
Stephenson asks us to consider the following disagreement data:
(81) a. Mary: Tuna is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, Tuna is not tasty.12
A natural explanation of the disagreement illustrated by (81) starts out by stipulating
that Mary in (81a) believes the proposition that Tuna is tasty and John in (81b) believes
the negation of that proposition. Thus, the parties in (81) disagree by virtue of hold-
ing noncotenable beliefs about the taste of tuna. Both the relativist semantics oered
by Lasersohn and the semantics oered by NIC possess the means to stipulate that the
parties in (81) disagree by virtue of holding noncotenable beliefs about the taste of tuna.
However, Stephenson maintains that these semantics wrongly predict that we should al-
ways interpret dialogues like (81) as illustrations of disagreement. In order to see why
the dialogue in (81) does not always illustrate disagreement, Stephenson asks us to con-
sider that the dialogue takes place in a context where Mary and John are feeding their
cat Tom.13 In this context Stephenson argues that there is a reading of (81) where Mary’s
utterance in (81a) expresses the proposition that tuna is tasty to Tom whereas John’s ut-
terance in (81b) expresses the proposition that tuna is not tasty to the judge where John
serves as the judge of the index. When the dialogue in (81) is interpreted in this manner
the parties in (81) do not hold noncotenable beliefs and by extension they do not doxas-
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Stephenson oers an alternative, more exible, relativist semantics.
Stephenson starts out by adopting Lasersohn’s idea that sentences containing predicates
of taste express propositions that have truth values with respect to 〈w, t, j〉 triples where
w is a world t is a time and j is a judge. Thus, Stephenson embraces the view that we
need an additional parameter in order to make sense of discourse about taste. But from
this point on Stephenson makes multiple innovations to the syntax and semantics of
the predicates of taste. First, Stephenson stipulates that ‘tasty’ and ‘beautiful’ are two-
place predicates. The extra argument place can be lled in three dierent ways. First,
the extra argument place can be lled by using a regular pronoun as in the following
sentence:
(82) Tuna is tasty to Mary.
Second, if a particular individual is salient the extra argument place can be lled by a null
pronoun prox. If the argument place is lled with prox a use of ‘Tuna is tasty’ where Mary
is the salient individual will express the same semantic content as a use of (82). Third, the
extra argument place can be lled by a special silent nominal PROJ. When ‘tasty’ takes
PROJ as object the resulting content is tasty for the judge.15 This content encodes judge
dependency because an occurrence of PROJ at C will pick out the judge of the index of
C. 16
With her novel semantics Stephenson can reinterpret the following dialogue:
(83) a. Mary: Tuna is tasty.





Chapter 3. Relativism versus NIC
According to the semantics oered by Stephenson both (83a) and (83b) have two possi-
ble interpretations depending on whether the extra argument place is lled with a null
pronoun prox referring to a salient individual or the silent nominal PROJ. This allows for
interpretations of the dialogue in (83) where the parties are disagreeing and interpreta-
tions where the parties are not disagreeing. For example, if both John and Mary use prox
the proposition expressed by (83a) might be tuna is tasty to Mary and the proposition
expressed by (83b) might be tuna is tasty to John. If this is the case the parties are not
holding noncotenable beliefs and by extension the parties are not having a doxastic dis-
agreement. On the other hand, if both Mary and John ll the argument place with PROJ
the parties in (83) will have noncotenable beliefs and by extension the parties will have
a doxastic disagreement of F-type.
Certainly Stephenson’s framework bestows the predicates of taste an impressive seman-
tic exibility. Nonetheless, I have some objections to Stephenson. First, Stephenson as-
sumes that it is a desideratum to explain why there are interpretations where the parties
in (83) are not disagreeing. However, it is not at all clear that this should be considered a
desideratum. On the contrary, the claim that there are readings of (83) where the parties
are are not disagreeing seems very strained. Second, the exibility of Stephenson’s se-
mantics has some unwanted consequences concerning the resolvability of disagreements
involving prox. In order to appreciate the issues that ow from prox we need to compare
the felicity of the following dialogues:
(84) a. Mary: Tuna is tasty to Tom.
b. John: Yuk, I disagree, tuna is not tasty at all.
c. Mary: Listen, I only said that tuna is tasty to Tom.
(85) a. Mary: Tuna is tasty.
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b. John: Yuk, I disagree, tuna is not tasty at all.
c. Mary: Listen, I only said that tuna is tasty to Tom.
In (84a) Mary is lling the extra argument place of ‘tasty’ with a regular pronoun re-
sulting in the proposition that Tuna is tasty to Tom. On the other hand John in (85b) is
lling the extra argument place with PROJ. Clearly, then the parties in (84a) are merely
talking past each other. Because the parties are merely talking past each other Mary in
(84c) can resolve the dispute by clarifying that she was only talking about Tom’s taste.
Furthermore, it is fairly easy to see that this clarication is felicitous. On Stephenson’s
view there are situations where the sentences in the dialogue illustrated by (84) and the
sentences in the dialogue illustrated by (85) express the same semantic content. All it
takes in Stephenson’s framework is that Mary in (85a) lls the argument place with prox
referring to her salient cat Tom. John does not recognize that Mary uses prox and lls
his use of ‘tasty’ with PROJ. In (85c) Mary claries that John’s use of the disagreement
marker ‘I disagree’ is out of place because she was only saying that tuna is tasty to Tom.
The problem is that there is a large discrepancy between the felicity of (85c) and (84c).
Whereas Mary’s clarication in (84c) is clearly felicitous, the clarication in (85c) is not.
How can there be such a large discrepancy in felicity if the sentences of both dialogues
express the same semantic content? It seems then, that Stephenson’s null pronoun prox
leads to issues that are similar to those we explored in §2.6.
3.5 Some Worries About Assertion
The speech act of assertion has played an important role in motivating the relativist
semantics of both Peter Lasersohn and Tamina Stephenson. In this section I argue that
71
Chapter 3. Relativism versus NIC
there are objections to both Lasersohn’s and Stephenson’s views about assertion. I then
argue that the account of assertion oered by NIC can circumvent the issues associated
with the relativist accounts of assertion.
We start out by considering the following examples:
(86) John: Licorice is tasty.
(87) a. Mary: How’s that new brand of cat food you bought?
b. John: It’s tasty, because the cat has eaten a lot of it.
In (86) we naturally take John’s assertion to be warranted if licorice is tasty to John. But
Peter Lasersoh has pointed out that in cases like (87) we naturally take John’s assertion in
(87b) to be warranted if the food in question is tasty to someone other than the asserter.18
In the case of (87) John’s assertion would be warranted if the new brand of cat food
is tasty to the contextually salient cat. In order to make sense of John’s assertion in
(87b) Lasersohn adopts the distinction between autocentric and exocentric perspectives
that we explored in §3.2. In the autocentric perspective an assertion is warranted if the
content of that assertion is true when the asserter serves as the judge. In the exocentric
perspective an assertion is warranted if the content of the assertion is true when the judge
is some salient individual other than the judge.19 Thus, the exocentric perspective makes
it possible for Lasersohn to stipulate that John’s assertion in (86) is warranted because the
content of the assertion is true when the contextually salient cat serves as judge.
Several commentators, like John MacFarlane and Tamina Stephenson have pointed out
that it is only natural to assert that something is tasty if the asserter has rst hand knowl-
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system that the exocentric perspective allows speakers to assert that licorice is tasty even
in cases where licorice is only tasty to a salient individual other than the asserter.
Tamina Stephenson has argued that her relativist semantics can oer a better account of
assertion. As we have seen Stephenson takes ‘tasty’ to be a two place predicate where
the extra argument place can be lled by the special nominal PROj, the null pronoun
prox or a regular pronoun as in ‘tasty to Sal’. In order to avoid the issues associated with
Lasersohn’s exocentric perspective Stephenson stipulates that uses of ‘licorice is tasty’
which are lled with PROj can only be asserted if the assertoric content is true when the
asserter serves as the judge of the index.20 Subsequently, Stephenson argues that in cases
like (87) John’s use of ‘tasty’ is lled with the null pronoun prox. In the case of (87) this
pronoun refers to the salient cat.
I concede that Stephenson’s approach circumvents the issues associated with Lasersohn’s
exocentric perspective. I also concede that Stephenson’s null pronoun prox makes it pos-
sible to explain cases like (87). But as we have seen in §3.4 Stephenson’s prox is associ-
ated with its own issues. Hence, by adopting Stephenson’s prox we would only trade one
problem for another.
How then, can we make sense of cases like (87). First I want to emphasize that both
Lasersohn and Stephenson assume that we should make sense of cases like (87) via the
semantics given to ‘tasty’. What I would like to suggest is that we follow John MacFarlane
by looking to the eld of pragmatics for a solution to cases like (87).
Here is a pragmatic view that nearly everyone should be able to accept: the meaning a
speaker intends to communicate by uttering a sentence S often goes substantially beyond
the semantic content of S. If we combine this pragmatic view with the semantics of NIC
20Stephenson 2007: 509.
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we can make sense of (87). First, according to the semantics of NIC the content asserted
by John in (87b) is something along the lines of the new cat food is tasty, because the cat
has eaten a lot of it. However, in light of the pragmatic context we understand that what
John intends to assert goes beyond the semantic content of his utterance. Presumably,
the intended content is something along the lines of the new cat food is tasty to the cat,
because he has eaten a lot of it. Furthermore, Mary is likely to understand that this is
what John intends to communicate because it is obvious from the context. Based on
such considerations I believe MacFarlane is right when he claims that we should not be
surprised by this kind of sloppy language use:
This kind of laziness is to be expected. We tend not to make things explicit
unless our audience is likely to misunderstand us.21
To sum up. Cases like (87) need not be explained by positing complex semantic mecha-
nisms. Rather, cases like (87) can be taken to illustrate that there are circumstances where
speakers express themselves with a low level of precision whilst managing to communi-
cate the intended meaning.
3.6 Assessment Sensitive Relativism
As with NIC and Lasersohn’s relativism it is useful to consider John MacFarlane’s as-
sessment sensitive relativism as an expansion of the system developed by David Kaplan
in the paper "Demonstratives".22 In this section I quickly sketch a Kaplan-style seman-
tic framework and show how to expand it in order to obtain MacFarlane’s assessment
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Farlane’s relativism and NIC all represent dierent strategies on how to expand Kaplan’s
framework to handle discourse about matters of taste.
As we saw in §3.2 Kaplan takes the proposition expressed by the following sentence to
be modally and temporally neutral:
(88) Picasso is painting.
To accommodate the modal and temporal neutrality of (88) Kaplan employs circum-
stances of evaluation consisting of 〈w, t〉 pairs where w is a world and t is a time.23 The
proposition expressed by (88) is then taken to have dierent truth values relative to dif-
ferent circumstances of evaluation. Furthermore Kaplan maintains that the circumstance
of the context of use is the relevant circumstance to look at when evaluating a use of (88)
for truth.24 In Kaplan’s system then, the context of use plays a bifurcated role. First, the
context of use determines the propositional content expressed by a sentence in that con-
text. In Kaplan’s paper this part is described as a function from contexts to contents.25
Second, the context of use initializes the parameters of the circumstances of evaluation,
setting them to be the world and time of the context of use.
Now consider the following sentence:
(1) Rhubarb is tasty
MacFarlane maintains that the proposition expressed by (1) is not only temporally and
modally neutral but also taste-neutral.26 In order to accommodate the taste-neutrality of
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a time and g is a taste. If we now compare the parameters employed by NIC and the rel-
ativist systems of Lasersohn and MacFarlane it becomes clear that there is considerable
overlap. Both NIC and MacFarlane’s relativist system use a 〈w, t, g〉 triple whilst Laser-
sohn deploys a 〈w, t, j〉 triple. Hence, the core dierences between the three systems
cannot be seen by merely looking at the composition of the circumstances they employ.
Rather, one must look at how the parameters of the circumstances are put to use. As we
have seen NIC privileges the circumstance of the context of use when evaluating the use
of a sentences for truth. Lasersohn dismisses this privilege by stipulating that the judge
parameter is not uniquely determined by objective features of the utterance situation.27
MacFarlane on the other hand makes a point of deploying a context of assessment in
addition to a context of use. When evaluating a use of (1) the context of use is taken
to determine what world and time to look at and the context of assessment is taken to
determine what taste to look at. By deploying two contexts MacFarlane can dene truth
at a context of use and assessment in the following manner:
A sentence φ is true as used at a context C1 and assessed from a context C2
i the proposition expressed by φ at C1 is true at C1, 〈wc1 , tc1 , gc2〉, where wc1
is the world of C1, tc1 is the time of C1 and gc2 is the taste of the agent of C2.28
In the denition above truth is doubly relativized to a context of use and a context of
assessment and this allows (1) to be true as used at a context C1 and assessed from C1,
but false as used at C1 and assessed from C2. Certainly, the assessment sensitive truth
predicate is a technical novelty; but why would we want to deploy such a complex truth
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3.7 Assessment Sensitive Disagreement
MacFarlane’s assessment sensitive relativism is partly motivated by considerations con-
cerning disagreement.29 In order to appreciate the virtues MacFarlane takes his account
of disagreement to oer, it is useful to compare MacFarlane’s account of disagreement
with the account of disagreement oered by NIC.
We start the comparison by considering the following disagreement data:
(89) a. Mary: Licorice is tasty.
b. John: I disagree, licorice is not tasty.
We have seen that the parties in (89) disagree because Mary believes the proposition that
licorice is tasty and John believes the negation of that proposition. That is, the parties
disagree by virtue of having noncotenable beliefs. Thus, John cannot come to believe
what Mary believes without giving up his own belief. But even though the parties have
noncotenable beliefs, it seems that no party is at fault by having the beliefs they have. In
order to explain how the parties can have noncotenable beliefs without being at fault I
have suggested that we deploy the following denition of accuracy:
Accuracy. A belief or assertion occurring at C is accurate, just in case its
content is true as used at C.
On this view, Mary’s belief at C that licorice is tasty can be accurate with respect to C
whereas John’s belief at C’ that licorice is not tasty can be accurate with respect to C’.
Hence, this notion of accuracy makes it clear that the parties in (89) are faultless by
virtue of having accurate beliefs. With the considerations above in mind I have argued
29MacFarlane 2014: 132.
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that the parties in (89) can be said to have the following type of disagreement:
Two parties have an F-type disagreement only if (A) there is a proposition
p such that one party believes p and the other party believes ¬p and (B) the
beliefs can both be accurate.
MacFarlane acknowledges that NIC oers a suitable explanation of the disagreement in
(89) if we assume that the parties in (89) are having an F-type disagreement.30 Nonethe-
less, MacFarlane also refers to the F-type disagreement captured by NIC as faux disagree-
ment.31 MacFarlane’s concern is that the notion of F-type disagreement proposed by NIC
oers too little conict between the parties in (89:
Although we can concede that doxastic noncotenability is a kind of disagree-
ment, we can now see that it is not going to give us everything we might have
wanted in a notion of disagreement. For, in at least one sense of disagreement
that we care deeply about, when two people disagree in virtue of having cer-
tain beliefs, those beliefs cannot both be accurate. If two people disagree,
they can’t both be right.32
What MacFarlane wants is an interpretation of the disagreement in (89) that is more akin
to the disagreement in (90):
(90) a. Mary: The Sun is at the center of the solar system.
b. John: I disagree, the Sun is not at the center of the solar system.
Let us assume that the proposition that (90) expresses the proposition that the Sun is at
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values relative to worlds and times. Furthermore, Mary asserts this proposition whilst
John asserts its negation. Because the proposition that the Sun is at the center of the solar
system and its negation cannot both be true at the same world and same time, the beliefs
of Mary and John cannot both be accurate and by extension Mary and John cannot both
be right.
In order to arrive at a notion of disagreement where the beliefs of the parties in (89)
cannot both be accurate, MacFarlane starts out by replacing our notion of accuracy with
the following one:
Accuracy. An attitude or speech act occurring at C1 is accurate, as assessed
from a context C2, just in case its content is true as used at C1 and assessed
from C2.33
According to the notion of accuracy given above, at any context, it is the taste of the
assessor that is relevant to the accuracy of all beliefs about what is tasty and what is
beautiful. If we analyze the disagreement in (89) in terms of MacFarlane’s notion of
accuracy, we get the result that Mary’s belief is accurate whilst John’s belief is inaccurate
as assessed from Mary’s context. Conversely, assessed from John’s context, his belief is
accurate and Mary’s belief is inaccurate. Finally, because the beliefs of Mary and John
cannot both be accurate MacFarlane can claim that the disagreement in (89) satises the
following condition:
Preclusion of joint accuracy. The accuracy of my attitudes (as assessed from
any context) precludes the accuracy of your attitude or speech act (as as-
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At this point we have to ask: should we consider it a desideratum to capture preclusion of
joint accuracy in MacFarlane’s sense? As far as I can tell there is at least two signicant
reasons not to accept preclusion of joint accuracy as a desideratum. First, I am not entirely
convinced that capturing preclusion of joint accuracy gives the relativists a more robust
notion of disagreement than the one oered by NIC. Keep in mind that when accuracy
is made assessment sensitive joint accuracy is precluded, but joint reexive accuracy is
not precluded:
Preclusion of joint reexive accuracy. The accuracy of my attitudes (as as-
sessed from my context) precludes the accuracy of your attitude or speech
act (as assessed from your context).
Thus, relativists allow that Mary’s belief in (89a) might be accurate as assessed from her
context of assessment whilst John’s belief in (89b) might be accurate assessed from John’s
context. But that means that on the relativist view there is still a sense in which the beliefs
of both parties can both be accurate and both right.
Second, the disagreement data does not suggest that we need to capture preclusion of
joint accuracy. The disagreement data that we have previously considered only suggests
that the disputing parties have noncotenable beliefs and that no party is at fault in having
the beliefs they have. But we can explain these features about the data without capturing
preclusion of joint accuracy. Thus, when we emphasize that the primary concern of
a semantic theory is to explain the data with as few resources as possible, there is a
burgeoning worry about the motivation behind MacFarlane’s account of disagreement.
The worry is that assessment sensitive relativism proliferates the semantic machinery
even more than NIC without oering any clear-cut explanatory benets with regard to
the disagreement data.
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3.8 Assertion and Retraction
Michael Dummett claimed that we cannot fully understand the signicance that the con-
cept of truth has for a language L merely by dening what it takes for sentences of L to
be true. In order to understand why this is so Dummett asks us to compare truth with the
concept of winning in the game of chess.35 Suppose that a person, say Annette, knows
that White can win at chess by putting Black’s king under threat of inescapable capture,
by making Black run out of time or by making Black resign the game. Surely in such
a case we would say that Annette understands what it takes for a player to win in the
game of chess. But if Annette only had this knowledge she would miss out on the fact
that players conventionally aim to win.36 Similarly, imagine a scenario where Annette,
understands what it takes for a sentence to count as a true sentence of a language L. In
such a scenario we would say that Annette understands what it takes for sentences of L
to be true. However, if Anette only had this information she would fail to recognize that
speakers of L conventionally aim to assert only true sentences. Hence, Annette would
fail to grasp the signicance that the concept of truth has for speakers of L. Based on
such considerations about the relation between truth and assertion Dummett makes the
following suggestion:
what has to be added to a truth-denition for the sentences of a language, if
the notion of truth is to be explained, is a description of the linguistic activity
of making assertions; and this is a task of enormous complexity.37
MacFarlane embraces Dummett’s suggestion and reasons that what we need in order to
grasp the signicance of assessment-relative truth is to identify what eects assessment-
35Dummett 1959: 142-143.
36Dummett 1959: 142-143. See also, MacFarlane 2014: 98-99.
37Dummett 1978: 20.
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relative truth has on the linguistic practice of assertion.38
MacFarlane starts out by deploying a traditional distinction between the force and con-
tent of an assertion where the content of an assertion is the proposition that is being
asserted and force of the assertion declares that the asserted proposition is true.39 Once
the distinction between force and content is up and running MacFarlane goes into more
contested territory by taking on the view that the speech act of assertion is governed by
constitutive rules.40 Providing a constitutive rule for assertion is to provide a rule that
governs every performance of assertion. No act which is not subject to the constitutive
rule can count as an assertion.41 After discarding some alternatives MacFarlane suggests
that the following rule is constitutive of assertion:
(A*). An agent is permitted to assert that p at context C1 only if p is true as
used at C1 and assessed from C1.42
What (A*) tells us is that an agent, say Susan, is permitted to assert p only if p is true
at the context of use and context of assessment occupied by Susan. At face value this
contention seems to sit well with the way speakers generally behave. Furthermore, (A*)
shows us some of the pragmatic signicance of assessment-relative truth. With (A*) in
mind, recall that I have previously suggested that we equip a semantics of NIC with the
following assertion rule:
(A). An agent is permitted to assert that p at context C only if p is true at C.
What (A) tells us is that an agent, say John, is permitted to assert p only if p is true at
38MacFarlane 2009: 97-101.
39MacFarlane 2009: 17.
40For a criticism of the view that speakers are governed by constitutive rules, see Cappelen 2010.
41MacFarlane 2014: 101. See also, Williamson 2000: 239.
42MacFarlane 2014: 103.
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the context occupied by John. But this is exactly what (A*) tells us about when speakers
are permitted to assert. The reason for the normative equivalence between (A) and (A*)
is that the context of assessment and the context of use overlap in (A*). Hence, (A) tells
us that it is always the context one occupies which is the context relative to which one
can assert only truths, which is equivalent to what (A*) tells us about assertability.
MacFarlane is quick to point out that the normative equivalence between (A) and (A*)
makes it so that we cannot look at (A*) in isolation if we are to grasp the normative sig-
nicance of assessement-relative truth. MacFarlane reasons that the remedy is to posit a
more sophisticated account of assertion, an account that does not only tell when speakers
are permitted to make assertions, but an account that also takes into consideration the
consequences of making assertions:
I think Dummett is right that our grip on truth comes from an understanding
of its relation to assertion. But where Dummett focused on the norms for
making an assertion, I propose we focus on the normative consequences of
making an assertion.43
What then are the consequences of making an assertion? According to MacFarlane
speakers who perform assertions take on a number of commitments by asserting. Here
is a list of commitments, not said to be exhaustive, that MacFarlane takes speakers to
undertake by asserting:
(C1) Commitment to retract the assertion if and when it is shown to have
been untrue.
(C2) Commitment to justify the assertion (provide grounds for its truth) if
and when it is appropriately challenged.
43MacFarlane 2005: 318.
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(C3) Commitment to be held responsible if someone else acts on or reasons
from what is asserted, and it proves to have been untrue.44
For MacFarlan’s purpose (C1), the commitment to retract, is the most important commit-
ment undertaken by performing an assertion. What then is a retraction? On MacFarlane’s
construal a retraction is a speech act that targets another speech act. The eect of the
retraction is to disavow the speaker from the commitments owing from the original
speech act:
The eect of retracting a speech act is to "undo" the normative changes ef-
fected by the original speech act. So, for example, in retracting a question,
one releases the audience from an obligation to answer it, and in retracting
an oer, one withdraws a permission that one has extended. Similarly, in re-
tracting an assertion, one disavows the assertoric commitment undertaken
in the original assertion. This means, among other things, that one is no
longer obliged to respond to challenges to the assertion (since one has al-
ready conceded, in eect), and that others are no longer entitled to rely on
one’s authority for the accuracy of this assertion.45
Hence, by retracting an assertion the retractor disavows himself from (C1)-(C3) and any
other commitments that might ow from the targeted assertion. Because of the strong
link between assertion and retraction, MacFarlane suggests that we can discern a nor-
mative dierence between NIC and assessment-relativism by taking into consideration
not only the norms governing assertion, but also the norms governing retraction. Here
is the norm MacFarlane takes to be constitutive of retraction:
(R). An agent in context C2 is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion
44MacFarlane 2005: 318. See also, MacFarlane 2014: 108.
45MacFarlane 2014: 108.
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of p made at C1 if p is not true as used at C1 and assessed from C2.46
Now, with (R) in mind, consider the following pair of sentences:
(91) Rhubarb is tasty
(92) Beatrice is beautiful
(R) predicts that if Annette would perform an assertion of (91) at C1, Annette would be
required to retract that assertion if she no longer likes rhubarb at C2. Similarly, if John
would perform an assertion of (92) at C1, John would be required to retract if he no
longer nds Beatrice beautiful at C2. Clearly then, (R) reveals the normative signicance
of assessment-relative truth because the obligation to retract an assertion is triggered by
facts about a context of assessment which does not always overlap with the context of
use.
Given that we can only discern the pragmatic relevance of assessment-relative truth by
looking at the relativist retraction norm, the speech act of retraction takes on a crucial
epistemic role:
A stronger, more interesting thesis is that some of the things we say and
think are assessment-sensitive. We have not established that, but we have at
least shown what such a claim would imply and what evidence might count
for or against it. To defend an assessment-sensitive semantics for a particular
class of sentences, one would have to adduce evidence about the norms for
defending and withdrawing assertions made using those sentences.47
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whether (R) is in force.
How can we determine whether (R) is in force? Presumably, competent speakers should
have a rm pre-theoretic grasp of the norms that govern the dierent speech acts. For
example, Timothy Williamson contends that competent speakers have a tacit grasp of
the constitutive rule governing assertion:
In mastering the speech act of assertion, one implicitly grasps the C-rule, in
whatever sense on implicitly grasps the rules of a game in mastering it. As
already noted, this requires some sensitivity to the dierence in both oneself
and others between conforming to the rule and breaking it. 48
Thus, if (R) is constitutive of retraction the intuitions of competent speakers should con-
verge towards the judgement that a retraction is obligated in the cases where (R) tells us
that a retraction is obligatory. As far as I can tell the most signicant worry about the
relativist account of retraction is the observation that many competent speakers do not
recognize that they have an obligation to retract in the cases where (R) predicts that a
retraction is obligatory. For example, consider a context where John asserts the propo-
sition that sh sticks are tasty. At a later context, John has a change of heart about the
taste of sh sticks. He then has the following exchange with Mary:
(93) a. Mary: Years ago you said that sh sticks were tasty, right?
b. John reply 1: Yes, but I take that back now.
c. John reply 2: Yes, I used to love sh sticks, but now I don’t.
If (R) is in force competent speakers should intuit that John has an obligation to use (93b)
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Diana Raman do not share this intuition. In fact, Raman claims that she would use the
reply in (93c) as a response to what Mary said in (93a):
But I think that is just what I would say—they were tasty then, but they
aren’t tasty anymore—and this would not have to imply that their taste had
changed. I think I would have no inclination to retract . . . . My point
here is not that MacFarlane’s intuitions are faulty. Rather, it’s that whatever
we may variously think people would say in such cases, our intuitions are
suciently divergent, and/or simply anemic, that MacFarlane’s constructed
examples cannot always bear the weight he places on them.50
Of course, Raman is not the only one who contends that the response in (93c) appears
to be entirely felicitous. In fact, I assume that most non-relativists will contend that (93c)
is an appropriate response to (93a). Thus, if relativists are going to contend that (R) is
in force, they owe us an explanation of why there are competent speakers who do not
recognize that they have an obligation to retract in the cases where (R) predicts that a
retraction is mandatory.
Before we move on, I would like to point out an important caveat about the observations
above. I have assumed that non-relativists do not intuit that they have an obligation
to retract in the cases where the relativists predict that a retraction is obligatory. Even
though this assumption about the intuitions of non-relativists is likely to be true, one
would have to conduct empirical surveys in order to have robust evidence in favor of
that assumption. In the case of epistemic modals such surveys have already been carried
out. All of surveys carried out so far has disconrmed the relativist account of retraction
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If we tentatively accept that (R) is disconrmed because there are competent speakers
who do not recognize that (R) is in play, we need to posit an alternative rule in order
to make sense of retraction in discourse about taste. The rst step towards that aim is
to identify a set of situations where not only some, but virtually all competent speak-
ers can agree that a retraction of a previous assertion is mandatory. At face value this
is a daunting project given that the intuitions that relativists and non-relativists have
about retraction are quite divergent. Nonetheless, it appears that both relativists and
non-relativists have some precious common ground in the constitutive rule of assertion.
Both the relativist (A*) and the non-relativist (A) tell us that it is always the context one
occupies which is the context relative to which one can assert only truths. Thus, the in-
tuitions of relativists and non-relativists converge when it comes down to identifying the
situations where speakers are permitted to assert. With this in mind it seems reasonable
to assume that both relativists and non-relativists can accept that an assertion which has
violated the assertion rule has to be retracted because the assertion was not permitted in
the rst place. Perhaps then, we can get some traction with the following rule:
(R*). An agent is required to retract an (unretracted) assertion of p made at
C if and when the assertion is shown to have violated (A).
We can illustrate how (R*) will fare in practice by considering the following sentences:
(94) Cameron is playing the piano.
(95) Lemonade is tasty.
What (R*) tells us is that an agent, say Mary, in context C2 is required to retract a previous
assertion of (94) made at C1 if she discovers that the assertion violated (A) when it was
made at C1. That is, if she discovers that Cameron did not play the piano at C1. The
same holds good with assertions of (95). However, in order to assert sentences like (95)
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speakers need to have rst hand knowledge about the taste of the relevant food. Hence, in
virtually all cases speakers will know immediately whether an assertion of (95) violated
(A) or not.
It is a somewhat open question how (R*) ts into a larger account of retraction which
takes into consideration retractions of questions, orders, requests, etc. As far I know
there is no prominent unied account of retraction in the literature and I will not attempt
to sketch a unied account of retraction here. What is important for my purpose is that
the predictions made by (A) and (R*) sit well with the intuitions of competent speakers.
Both relativists and non-relativists can agree that assertions are permitted in the cases
predicted by (A) and similarly, both camps can agree that retractions are obligatory in
the cases predicted by (R*).
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3.9 Conclusion
The semantic machinery oered by contextualism is highly parsimonious. Thus, there
is a methodological incentive to embrace contextualism. On the other hand, I have ar-
gued that there are multiple types of semantic data that are problematic for contextual-
ism. I started by exploring some of the familiar issues that standard contextualism face
with respect to indirect speech reports. Subsequently, I turned to exible contextualism
and argued that exible contextualists have problems with sentences containing multiple
predicates of taste.
Whilst the previous issues are signicant in their own right, it is the phenomenon of dis-
agreement that stands at the core of the debate about contextualism. At face value, both
standard and exible contextualists struggle to provide an account of how it is possible
for speakers to disagree about matters of taste. I have explored two prominent responses
to the problem of disagreement on behalf of contextualism. The rst and arguably most
promising response on behalf of contextualism is provided by Tornn Huvenes. Huvenes
oers a view of disagreement where two parties can disagree not only by having con-
icting doxastic attitudes, but also by having conicting non-doxastic attitudes. I have
tentatively embraced the pluralistic conception of disagreement oered by Huvenes and
conceded that it oers contextualists the means to explain how there can be non-doxastic
disagreement in discourse about taste. On the other hand I have drawn attention to a
range of disagreement data which suggests that the disputing parties are disagreeing by
virtue of having conicting beliefs. If the data I have presented is legitimate, contextu-
alists still owe us an explanation of how two parties can disagree by virtue of having
conicting beliefs about some matter of taste.
The second response, favored by Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne, reject the con-
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tention that speakers disagree about matters of taste. I have argued that that this view
does not sit well with the persistence of the disputes displayed by the semantic data. Fi-
nally, I oered an account of disagreement for NIC that can explain how two parties can
disagree by having conicting beliefs about some matter of taste.
The next task was to explore whether the prominent relativistic systems of Peter Laser-
sohn, Tamina Stephenson and John MacFarlane oered any clear-cut explanatory bene-
ts when compared to NIC. We saw that Lasersohn motivated his brand of relativism by
arguing that it can provide an account of disagreement in discourse about taste. I con-
ceded that Lasersohn’s relativism can explain all the varieties of disagreement present
in discourse about taste. However, I also argued that NIC can accommodate the relevant
disagreement data whilst positing less unorthodox semantic mechanisms. Therefore, we
have a methodological incentive to favor the more parsimonious semantics oered by
NIC over the relativist semantics oered by Lasersohn.
Subsequently, we saw that Tamina Stephenson has drawn attention to disagreement data
which she argues that neither the relativist semantics of Lasersohn nor the semantics of
NIC suce to accommodate. Rather, we ought to embrace her more exible relativist
semantics if we are to accommodate the disagreement data. I have objected that Stephen-
son’s interpretation of the disagreement data is awed. Furthermore I have pointed
out that her variety of relativism is associated with its own issues concerning disagree-
ment.
Finally, I explored MacFarlane’s assessment sensitive relativism. MacFarlane has argued
that the data concerning disagreement and retraction suggests that we need assessment-
relativism in order to oer a satisfactory semantics for the predicates of taste. I have con-
ceded that MacFarlane’s relativism can accommodate the disagreement data. Nonethe-
less, the disagreement data does not unambiguously favor assessment-relativism. NIC
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can accommodate the crucial features of the disagreement data with a more trimmed se-
mantic apparatus. Additionally, I have argued that MacFarlane’s account of retraction
does not sit well with the observation that there are competent speakers who do not
recognize that the relativist retraction rule is in force. Finally, I proposed an alternative
account of retraction that better accommodates our intuitions about retraction. Thus, I
contend that the semantic data does not suggest that the most prevalent relativist seman-
tics oer any clear explanatory benets when compared to NIC.
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